After the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, it was semi-presidentialism—a rare model known more generally as the "French type." This constitutional model melded elements of pure presidentialism with those of pure parliamentarism. Specifically, semi-presidentialism combined a popularly elected head of state with a head of government responsible to a legislature.
Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century-Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic-Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy. She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, Skach challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice. This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs.
Many emerging democracies across the globe are scrambling to craft new constitutions. The modal constitution being chosen in this most recent wave of democratization is a rather unknown, and under–theorized, type: semi–presidentialism. This article brings semi–presidentialism back to comparative constitutional theory, distinguishing it from presidentialism and parliamentarism, and guarding against its hasty export to new democracies. This article details when, and why, semi–presidentialism can be problematic from the standpoints of democracy, constitutionalism, and the protection of fundamental rights; and the conditions under which it can be supportive of them. After establishing the analytical framework, this article compares developments in two important historical cases of regime change under semi–presidentialism, cases which have also been among the most influential countries for European politics in the twentieth century: the French Fifth Republic and Weimar Germany. The concluding section draws the evidence together.
1065_cs_constitutionalorigins.pdfThis article reviews arguments in favour of a formal, written constitution for Europe, and concludes with a better suggestion – a Basic European Law. The article also criticizes the wholehearted embrace of ?popular constitution–making?. It does so by drawing on comparative evidence from constitution–making processes in various his–torical time periods and world regions. It poses three essential questions to organize the debate. First, why a European constitution? Second, what kind of European con–stitution? Third, how a European constitution?
