Harvard’s old Center for International Affairs was re-named and re-dedicated on April 16, 1998. The new Weatherhead Center for International Affairs has fostered the transformation of international and comparative studies at Harvard ever since. The Center has been able to play an intellectual leadership role within and beyond the University, addressing through its research the key international problems of our time and indicating novel ways to think about them.

In fall 2002, the Weatherhead Foundation Board decided to make an additional endowment gift to the Weatherhead Center to support the expansion of the Center’s programs for graduate and undergraduate students, as well as to strengthen the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, which is also housed at the Center.

Al Weatherhead’s generosity, an already impressive part of Harvard history, now extends even more deeply to this new commitment to support the research of graduate and undergraduate students and postdoctoral fellows. I would like to put this wonderful new gift in some perspective.

Thanks to the original Weatherhead gift, the Center’s various programs support research on a wide variety of topics. Consider some examples from the research conducted thanks to just one of the Center’s programs, namely, funded research-semester sabbaticals for senior and junior faculty:

- The extent to which national economies have become globalized, and the implications of such globalization for technological change and wages
- How transnational advocacy alliances have lobbied multilateral development banks and international dam-building consortia on behalf of people adversely affected by the building of high dams
- How dispute resolution works in international trade and how disputants go “international forum shopping” to gain bargaining leverage
- The evolution and salience of popular voluntary associations in various countries, including the United States
- The determinants of political reform, economic growth, and political violence in Africa
- The present nature of global society and the ethical imperatives, choices, and constraints for this society
- Emerging aspects of the political and economic impact of diasporas
- The size of nations.

Continued page 3

The 2003 Fellows conference and reunion will be held from November 20 to 22. For more information please contact Fellows Program director, Kathleen Molony, at kmolony@wcfia.harvard.edu.
From the Director ...

The Weatherhead Center has also transformed its own intellectual community through an active and lively program of conferences and seminars. The Center sponsors a major international conference on average every three weeks during the academic year on issues that range from the future of war to the prospects for the euro. The center fields over thirty seminars on subjects that span the spectrum of human knowledge in the social sciences and across the globe.

The Weatherhead Center Graduate Student Associate Program has been widely recognized as representing the “best practices” at Harvard on how to engage and support the work of graduate students at the dissertation stage. Consider the following testimony from three former Graduate Student Associates from the late 1990s:

As a Chinese saying goes, “a boat rises only when the water rises.” What the Center has meant for me is what the water is to the boat. When you are in the company of highly accomplished, motivated, and intelligent people, you accomplish twice as much... This is what happened to me as a member of the Weatherhead Center community. Evidence? I was able to write up my dissertation in less than a year. I can’t imagine doing so without the benefit of the constant bouncing of ideas among students, Fellows, and faculty associates at the Center.

Fu Jun, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, China

The Weatherhead Center has been the center of my intellectual life at Harvard. I have been part of the Weatherhead Center community almost continuously [for the past three years]. And membership has given me the two things that I have found to be the most important... conditions for doing good work: intellectual stimulation—through the frequent seminars, the easy interaction with Fellows and other visitors, and the sharing of research at the graduate student associate lunches—and office space.

Kanchan Chandra, M.I.T.

Preparing the dissertation for the job market turned out to be more of a collective effort than I had imagined. I gave two practice job talks at the Center, both of which helped me immeasurably in my attempt to pare down the details of my work to a few key points that could be connected to other areas of inquiry in the field. By sharing my work with colleagues working on different projects, I could tease out which aspects of my work resonated with others.

Kathleen O’Neill, Cornell University

The Weatherhead Center has also developed active and successful programs for undergraduates. For example, in coordination with the Weatherhead Center Student Council, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Center’s faculty and Fellows met with undergraduates in various venues. The Student Council regularly sponsors an International Careers Week, modestly begun years ago as just one “International Careers Dinner,” for which the Weatherhead Center Fellows are an especially valuable resource. The Center’s Fellows Program has developed a successful partnership program between some of the Fellows and some undergraduates, to their mutual benefit.

At the heart of the Weatherhead Center’s support for student research is a series of grants. Center grants support graduate student pre-dissertation travel as well as dissertation write-up time. Center grants support thesis research travel by seniors. And we provide such support for research travel to all parts of the world for all subjects in the social sciences, including history.

The Center’s problem had been that the demand for its support far outstripped our capacity to provide it. We knew that we could do more to support dissertation write-up time as well as to help graduate students early in their dissertation work. We knew that we could send more undergraduates abroad to engage in serious work. And we had long understood that our Graduate Student Associate Program, though very effective, ran on a shoestring; it could do an even better job with additional resources. The Weatherhead Foundation’s new endowment gift addresses these concerns. The Weatherhead Center will be able to support graduate and undergraduate student research far more effectively.

The original Weatherhead gift compelled the Center to take stock of itself. Various faculty task forces set priorities and procedures that have since been implemented. The Center is a collegial institution: It does what its faculty members want it to do. The new Weatherhead gift compels the Center to take stock of its student programs but it also provides an opportunity to think more widely about the Center’s purposes and organization. The Center’s executive committee, along with five faculty task forces, has been reviewing Center programs and making recommendations. Discussions have also been held with Graduate Student Associates. By the end of the current academic year and the beginning of the next, we should have adopted a number of important changes and will be on our way toward implementation.

Al Weatherhead has challenged us again and again to do the best work we can. We are grateful to him for many reasons—that one above all.
More than a Drought this Time
the Food Crisis in Southern Africa

This article is adapted from remarks delivered on January 31, 2003, to a “Conference on Food Security Issues in East and Southern Africa” sponsored by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. Department of State and the National Intelligence Council.

Six nations in southern Africa are facing a serious food crisis. A drought hit the region in 2001-02, and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has estimated that 15 million people in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland will need millions of tons of international food aid to survive until the next cereal harvest begins, in April 2003.

This might look like a manageable short-term problem. A far more severe drought hit the region in 1991-92, and on that occasion an even greater number of people—18 million—needed international food aid. Thanks to well-organized international relief efforts the food arrived and famine was largely avoided; the only starvation deaths reported in 1992 were in Mozambique where a lingering civil war blocked aid deliveries. When normal rains returned, harvests in the region rebounded and food aid could safely be terminated.

This time around it should have been even more manageable. Currently there are no civil wars in the region and the 2001-02 drought was far less severe. The earlier 1991-92 El Niño drought was and still is the worst on record for the region; aggregate cereal production in the region declined by 54 percent when this massive disaster struck. In contrast following the 2001-02 drought, aggregate maize production in the region declined by only 7 percent. If the drought this time was so much less severe than in 1991-92, why have nearly as many people in the region been put at risk?

Declining Per Capita Food Production

Throughout the decade of the 1990s, population growth remained high in southern Africa while the countries of the region struggled with cereal production. On a per capita basis, cereal production in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia actually declined by 20 to 32 percent between calendar year 1991 and calendar year 2001 (both were pre-drought years of normal rains). Thus, even a small drought in 2001-02 was enough to push regional supplies below a safe threshold. Farm productivity was lagging so badly in the 1990s that cereal output actually declined per hectare as well as per capita. Farmers in Zimbabwe were producing 9 percent less on the same area of land in 2001 compared to 1991, and farmers in Zambia were producing 11 percent less. The conventional causes of this farm productivity collapse include inadequate government investments in rural infrastructure and agricultural research, plus in some cases a reduction in fertilizer subsidies due to budget deficits and structural adjustment. Yet some unconventional factors were also at work, including disruptive land redistribution programs and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS.

HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS was scarcely a factor in the 1991-92 food emergency, but by 2001-02 HIV prevalence in the region had reached 25 percent. The spread of this disease undercuts food security in multiple ways. It reduces the capacity of individuals to survive on diminished food rations. It reduces the capacity of individuals to do the hard physical labor required by farming (witness the productivity declines noted above). It also reduces the wage-earning potential of adults, who then find it more difficult to feed their families when food prices in the market begin to rise. Even those without the disease can find their labor and cash circumstances compromised because of the time and expense required to care for—and then to bury—family members who have become sick. Most of the caregivers are of course women, the same women who are still expected in Africa to contribute most to the work of basic food production.

HIV/AIDS also undercuts the future farm productivity of the region by denying inheritances to the orphaned children of AIDS victims. When both parents in a family die, the orphaned children can lose their right to a land inheritance. They can also be denied the instruction in basic farming skills that parents traditionally provide. There are already 2.5 million AIDS orphans in southern Africa, vulnerable to hunger today because they have come to depend on the over-stretched resources of uncles or grandparents.

The spreading HIV/AIDS crisis in southern Africa has already overwhelmed health sectors,
and now it is beginning to overwhelm the farming sector. The education sector, the transport sector, and the water sector will be next. In January 2003, James Morris, the World Food Programme Director and the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy for humanitarian needs in Southern Africa described the AIDS crisis as “an emergency that we have never known before. We are simply going to have to look at things differently from now on.”

Poor Government Policies

Governments in southern Africa performed exceptionally well in response to the 1991-92 emergency. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) later praised them for having “heeded early warnings of impending food supply shortfalls and made timely and adequate contingency plans.” In the current crisis, the governments of Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have all taken actions that make the crisis worse.

In 2001, just before the crisis, Malawi actually had a grain surplus. The government was holding nearly 200,000 tons of grain in public storage, far more than needed. A European Commission study concluded that a 60,000 metric-ton reserve would be a sufficient buffer against drought, so the International Monetary Fund advised the government to sell some of this reserves. Unfortunately, Malawi’s National Food Reserve Agency sold off all of the grain reserves—all but about 4,000 tons. The grain was sold to private traders who allegedly hoarded the food and later tried to sell it at exorbitant prices. When the 2001-02 drought struck and Malawi asked donors for help to replenish the reserve, the donors naturally hesitated on the grounds that the government could not account for the monies raised from the sale of the reserves.

The government of Zambia has also played an unhelpful role in the current crisis. In August 2002, with nearly 3 million of their own citizens confronting a possible famine, Zambia’s rulers announced they would not accept any corn from the United States as food aid because farmers in the United States were known to be planting “genetically modified” (GM) corn seeds. The corn the Zambians were rejecting was exactly the same corn Americans had been consuming without problems since 1995, and the same U.S. corn that WFP had been distributing throughout Africa—including Zambia—for the previous six years. For Zambia to reject all U.S. corn (and to ask that stocks already delivered be taken out of the country) was a complication WFP did not need in 2002.

It required an exceptional effort to find and route sufficient quantities of non-GM corn from South Africa and Tanzania to replace the U.S. corn that was being blocked and removed from Zambia. The assistance pipeline was briefly empty, hardships increased, and in January 2003 a mob of 6,000 hungry villagers in one rural town overpowered an armed policeman to loot a storehouse filled with U.S. corn before it could be taken out of the country.

Government actions in Zimbabwe have worsened the current crisis in a number of ways. The regime of Robert Mugabe has long mismanaged the nation’s economy, leading to negative 10 percent GDP growth rates, a loss of one third of all jobs since 2000, and a doubling of the number of people in poverty compared to 1992. Policies in the food and farming sector have been particularly damaging in the current crisis. In 2002, productive white farmers were evicted in the middle of the growing season. Only half of the land once farmed is now under cultivation. Once a breadbasket, Zimbabwe is now the region’s largest food aid recipient. When the drought struck in late 2001, the government delayed a timely response by denying the existence of a food crisis until after the presidential elections were completed in March 2002. The government has also refused to weaken the monopoly powers of the official Grain Marketing Board. This party-controlled agency stifles private imports and allocates scarce food supplies to regions and neighborhoods known to support President Mugabe. Private maize traders seeking to serve other areas are threatened with arrest. The food aid now pouring into the country has also been kept away from groups or regions that failed to support Mugabe in the 2002 elections.

Food Aid and Rain is not Enough this Time

The food crisis in southern Africa today is a new kind of complex humanitarian emergency. There has been a drought, and food aid and normal rainfall are urgently needed in the short run. But this time the problem will not be solved even if the aid arrives and the rains return. Large and continuing investments will also be required in rural infrastructure, research, and extension work to support farm productivity. More energetic efforts will be required to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS. And governments in the region must be held to higher standards of responsibility and accountability. Without such deeper policy responses, the crisis will persist and possibly worsen.
For the past eight months I have been a keen observer of conversations within the academy on a major international issue that simultaneously preoccupies ordinary civil and political society and dominates the media. In search of illumination I have attended many classroom discussions, seminars, panels, Kennedy School Forum debates, and presentations by guest speakers. I have inevitably compared what I have heard here against conversations within the British government, in U.S.-U.K. official exchanges, within the UN special commissions for Iraq, and in International Pugwash and think tanks in Washington and Europe.

I have been struck by a pattern. At Harvard I observe predictable and repeated emphases on the immediate dangers of U.S. military action such as harm to Iraqi civilians and U.S. servicemen, the plausibility of Iraq's links with al Qaeda, the opened-ended risks of war and occupation, and the chances of regional instabilities, aggravated terrorism, and its consequences for U.S. homeland security. I have also noted the prominence, particularly among younger participants, of a moral revulsion against any non-immediately defensive war, especially one initiated by American forces against much less militarily capable states. Distrust of the Bush administration, in particular, and unrestrained presidential power, in general, is a frequent motif. Among security specialists there is a professional fascination with the reliability of containment as an alternative to regime change to manage the crisis. A visiting strategic anthropologist, if there were such a profession, might therefore characterize the main preoccupations of the internal Harvard debate as short- to medium-term, and either moralistic or nationally prudential.

These are by no means discreditable or trivial concerns. But they are insufficient, particularly for a university that purports to give its members a full, cosmopolitan, and long-term perspective on international relations. The indirect and longer-term aspects of the present dilemma are very much less well understood and much less frequently addressed. These aspects include the challenge that the Iraqi crisis poses for the credibility of international institutions, international law, and the management of diffusing technologies of mass destruction for the remainder of this century and beyond. They will have a decided impact on the future world order. They are also, no less than the first set, American concerns. I discuss some of them below:

1) Iraq’s obligations—deliberately imposed and repeatedly reaffirmed by the Security Council as a result of its regime’s insistently aggressive behavior—are legally unique. Its determination to obtain and brandish weapons of mass destruction demonstrates both persistent, obvious contempt for international norms and reckless bad judgement. This is a combination that poses a critical challenge to any concept of rule-governed international behavior.

2) There are diplomatically and legally critical distinctions that I have almost never heard expressed by scholars, visiting controversialists, or impassioned graduate students between Iraq’s situation and that of Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Iraq is a signatory and admitted violator of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention and is a violator of an exceptionally rare enforceable Security Council resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Neither Israel, nor India, nor Pakistan has signed the NPT. And while North Korea (and no doubt others to come) may be in violation of the NPT, no international legal compliance enforcement action has yet been agreed within the United Nations or International Atomic Energy Agency process against it.

3) It is also largely unappreciated how much weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities once achieved—even if clandestine or denied but credibly suspected by intelligence agencies—exert a constant, permanent, and invisible influence on all regional strategic calculations. It is not adequate intellectually, even if it might be indispensable for domestic American politics, to concentrate only on imminent threat of use. (The Cuban missile crisis, for example, so often and so lovingly reexamined as a triumph of American statecraft, was not spurred by an immediate risk of Soviet attack. The world was brought to the brink of unprecedented destruction because the attempted horizontal proliferation was regarded—almost certainly correctly, in the context of an unavoid-
able, long running nuclear confrontation—as strategically unacceptable by President Kennedy.)

4) The Cuban missile crisis vividly illustrates the considerable cumulative risk in undertaking to conduct nuclear containment indefinitely to deal with multiple would-be regional hegemons. Such states, including Iraq, would certainly be outgunned in nuclear capability by the United States, but these states' potentially more fanatical commitment to the outcome of a crisis could lead them to misjudge, fatally, their chances of success in any heightened confrontation.

5) The course of the present crisis precisely undermines predictions of containability. (Indeed it probably calls into question the universal applicability of the realist paradigm of state behavior.) Rather than give up his objectives in the confrontation over prohibited programs, Saddam has chosen, over twelve years, to manage the internal impact of economic sanctions in a way that has cumulatively devastated Iraq's infrastructure and caused hundreds of thousands of avoidable civilian deaths. He is now at least risking, and more probably heading inexorably for, the termination of his regime by superior force. A clearly announced, overwhelming and imminent threat has not produced fundamental changes in his strategic behavior, though it may be sharpening his skills in diplomatic obfuscation.

6) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime as a central institution of world order is important, but it is fragile. It is certainly imperfect and under strain. Its long-term effectiveness relies on the general belief that its undertakings will be honored and that some form of effective action will be taken against noncompliance. It does erect a distinction that many find unacceptably discriminatory between legally nuclear and non-nuclear states. But if it were to collapse, nuclear (and almost certainly biological) weapons will progressively and probably irreversibly enter the strategic landscape of more and more regions around the world.

7) Similar arguments apply to the credibility of the United Nations. It is imperfect and very often unreliable, but for the solution of many problems it is all we have, and it is not an institution that can be reinvented or reassembled.

8) The nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation under way—usually clandestinely but not always irrevocably—elsewhere in the world apart from Iraq is extensive. There is a thriving and largely unrestricted trade in long-range ballistic missiles that are too inaccurate to have any convincing conventional military use. Although the United States government has repeatedly mentioned several suspected states, there is an alarming lack of connection between the proliferation community and other international relations experts. (The Academy undoubtedly suffers from a pervasive and genuine disadvantage due to an inevitable lack of background intelligence data, which might suggest greater modesty of academic assertions on the basis of open sources alone.) Whatever the reticence of academics, a growing number of states will be reaching silent internal judgments on the basis of the Iraqi test case—which involves the highest profile offender with the fewest possible redeeming features—about the world's willingness to act in ways that will be effective or dependable in the long term against noncompliance with treaties or international laws. This episode's conclusion will provide important precedents for international toleration of willful national bluffing, cheating, and concealment.

9) The looming problem of bio-weapons is not yet fully appreciated. Here the black hole of Iraqi deception and denial is greatest. The world is only now coming to grips with what might be involved in controlling these least verifiable but most widespread and far-reaching technologies. The exact contributions of export controls, disarmament, defensive capabilities, and deterrence to international policy options are not yet clear. But political will and the determination to deal with the possession of this largely illegal category of weapons will be critical. Thus far it has certainly not been indisputably manifest over Iraq.

10) It is genuinely implausible to expect that strict adherence to the norms of Westphalian sovereign independence will prevent the development of a highly proliferated planet. Present day arms-control obligations are insufficient, and although I should not have to point out how undesirable such a planet would be for general human security—and, particularly, for Western and U.S. interests—judging from the impressions I have gathered it bears repeating.

11) It is a statistical certainty that the more states that are in possession of weapons of mass destruction the greater the chance of instabilities, sudden extremist changes of regime, and leaks of materials, weapons, and expertise, which will over time lead to the transfer of these capabilities to terrorist groups. And the world will change irrevocably once they are used. Against this, Cooperative Threat Reduction, through improved security and more rapid neutralization of the weapons legacies of Soviet armaments from the cold war, remains an important priority frequently discussed at Harvard. Like motherhood, though even more expensive, this concern is hard to oppose, but it
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will not solve an intransigent variety of problems. Overall, the disposal of declared surpluses of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials cannot be a sufficient answer to the risks of WMD proliferation to non-state actors if new materials are continuously created in secret around the world.

12) The potential or actual use of U.S. expeditionary force has been the decisive factor in the current Iraqi crisis. More generally, today’s unmatched and unprecedented U.S. military capability emerges from and perpetuates a complex system of interlocking security choices around the globe. It is in large measure the result of investment decisions that friends, allies, and neutrals have not had to choose to make. The process that has led to U.S. military predominance has not been accidental. America has deliberately made itself the nearly indispensable basis for a global network of existing security guarantees and for effective future international interventionist coalitions. This, from many points of view, could benefit the planet, avoiding risks of future great power conflict and the enormous expense of building up counterbalancing forces. But how can the American military be more widely perceived as a reliable source of global security—especially against WMD-armed adversaries—rather than of uncertainty or active insecurity? How far can a realistic definition of multilateral action be developed that does not in effect (and perhaps by intention) neuter that interventionist capability? Is the United States capable of acting for the global good in a way in which most of the world approves? Can the United States convince a sufficient number of committed and effective states that its own political culture renders the imposition of American empire both unrealistic and undesirable, even in the most narrowly operational terms?

These are formidable questions, but they must be confronted in order to judge what is at stake over Iraq. While the Harvard community should not be expected to propose responses that offer easy ways out of the crisis, I am surprised at the lack of creative or even policy-relevant analysis or proposals that would take thinking forward. Hanging in the balance are the most far-reaching implications for the future of proliferation and compliance. The moment demands a comprehensive understanding of the technical, military, legal, political, and ethical factors that are shaping proliferation. From this could follow a realistic assessment of how far proliferation might be slowed or reversed if those factors were creatively, firmly, and systematically addressed—or what can be expected if this does not happen. All that seems to me a very proper and indeed inescapable project for university international studies experts. Yet, apart from recurrent anxieties about nuclear and bio-terrorism, there appears rather little urgent concern about the wider ways that the unchecked spread of WMD technologies will transform both world politics and the everyday preoccupations of ordinary people.

I witness, instead, the no-doubt psychologically satisfying but ultimately unproductive re-run of emotions of the last great American crisis, in Vietnam. This debate over national involvement in conflict in the name of wider principles has recurred over every subsequent intervention decision such as Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. I am old enough to have experienced the passions of Vietnam at first hand, and it does not surprise me that they remain so strong. But we face a new world. Long-running internal American cultural and political disputes are far less constructive than objectively supported and passionate new thinking. If there is no more comprehensive and far-reaching intellectual response, the process of displacement of the major universities by Beltway-based think tanks for the attention of the policy-making classes, which my Washington friends already speak of, can be expected to continue.

To be scrupulous, I should exclude two categories of opinion from any accusation of incomplete appreciation of the wider issues around Iraq. First, sternly realist international relations theorists who believe that nuclear weapons will inevitably spread and might even be stabilizing are less concerned about the outcome of successful Iraqi defiance of international obligations. They should, however, explain to the rest of the world why their grim picture of eternal, inescapable, WMD-backed competition between great powers has appeal as an acceptable future. Second, radicals and moralists such as Noam Chomsky can certainly reject any use of force to support what they see as a fundamentally corrupt and unjust world order. Their obligation, however, remains to persuade others that neither sanctions nor—when sanctions fail, as they evidently have in the current crisis—force should be applied even to the worst regimes retaining or rebuilding the worst weapons under the most internationally undermining circumstances.

My own bias is no doubt apparent. I am convinced that there is a clear, critical, and indispensable choice for the international community to make over Iraq. Ingenious diplomatic normalization cannot hide the fundamental question,
Nothing is Sacred
Economic Ideas for the New Millennium
by Robert J. Barro

In Nothing Is Sacred, Barro applies his well-honed free market arguments to a remarkably diverse range of issues. These include global problems such as growth and debt, as well as social issues such as the predictive value of SAT scores, drug legalization, the economics of beauty, and the relationship between abortion rights and crime reduction. (MIT Press, September 2002)

Robert Barro is the Robert C. Waggoner professor of economics at Harvard and a Weatherhead Center faculty associate.

The Changing Face of Home
Transnational Lives of the Second Generation
edited by Peggy Levitt and Mary Waters

The children of immigrants account for the fastest growing segment of the U.S. population under 18 years old - one out of every five children in the United States. Will this generation of immigrant children follow the path of earlier waves of immigrants and gradually assimilate into mainstream American life, or does the global nature of the contemporary world mean that the trajectory of today’s immigrants will be fundamentally different? Rather than severing their ties to their home countries, many immigrants today sustain economic, political, and religious ties to their homelands, even as they work, vote, and pray in the countries that receive them. The Changing Face of Home is the first book to examine the extent to which the children of immigrants engage in such transnational practices. (Russell Sage Foundation Press, November 2002)

Peggy Levitt is an assistant professor of sociology at Wellesley College. Mary C. Waters is a professor of sociology at Harvard and a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center.

Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America
Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective
by Steven Levitsky

Why did some Latin American labor-based parties adapt successfully to the contemporary challenges of neoliberalism and working class decline while others did not? Drawing on a detailed study of the Argentine Peronism, as well as a broader comparative analysis, this book develops an organizational approach to party change. Levitsky’s study breaks new ground in its focus on informal and weakly institutionalized party structures. It argues that loosely structured party organizations, such as those found in many populist labor-based parties, are often better equipped to adapt to rapid environmental change than are more bureaucratic labor-based parties. The argument is illustrated in the case of Peronism, a mass labor-based party with a highly fluid internal structure. The book shows how this weakly routinized structure allowed party reformers to undertake a set of far-reaching coalitional and programmatic changes that enabled Peronism to survive, and even thrive, in the neoliberal era. (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)

Steven Levitsky is assistant professor of government and of social studies at Harvard and a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center.
On December 10, 2002, the Executive Committee of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs awarded $220,000 to a research team comprised of four University faculty members to commence a long-term research project on “International Human Capital Flows and their Effects on Developing Countries.” This decision marked the Center’s fourth annual award of a Weatherhead Initiative grant, a program established in 1998 by a generous gift from Albert and Celia Weatherhead and the Weatherhead Foundation.

The interdisciplinary research project will analyze political economy factors that drive the immigration policies of rich countries in order to better understand the forces affecting the international demand for human capital. The research team will examine the impact of these policies on developing countries by studying the economic and political effects of skilled emigration on those countries. The team will also explore policy responses available to developing countries in the face of increasing global competition for skilled workers. The premise of this research proposal is that cross-border flows of human capital are likely to play an increasingly influential role in shaping the political and economic landscape over the next fifty years. This process will be driven by structural factors—both demographic and technological—in developing and developed countries. Moreover, international human capital flows—in particular flows from developing to developed countries—are determined to a considerable extent by rich country immigration controls, not only by differences in economic opportunity.

The central elements of the project will draw on the contributions of the four members of the Harvard faculty: Mihir A. Desai, assistant professor of business administration in the finance and entrepreneurial management areas of Harvard Business School, a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center, and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research; Devesh Kapur, associate professor of government in the Department of Government and a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center and the Center for International Development at Harvard University; Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri professor of international political economy at the Kennedy School of Government, a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center, and Mark R. Rosenzweig, professor of public policy at the Kennedy School of Government. The project team also includes John McHale, associate professor of economics at Queen’s School of Business in Kingston, Ontario.

The potential impact of this multi-year research project is substantial. One reviewer observed that “the political economy of migration broadly speaking is a critical one. This proposal focuses on one important aspect of it, namely foreign migration of skilled labor, an important sub-topic of the general one on labor migration.” This issue, referred to for many years as “brain drain,” has been largely ignored since the pioneering work of J. Bhagwati in the 1970s.

Although the flight of human capital appears particularly pronounced in countries suffering from civil conflict and economic stagnation where human capital is scarce, the phenomenon is much more encompassing. The research team contends that demographic changes and consequent fiscal stresses in industrialized countries will affect their immigration policies in three critical ways: they will allow a greater magnitude of immigration to ease the fiscal pressures of aging societies; they will become increasingly selective about the immigrants they seek to attract and admit; and they will increasingly encourage temporary immigration, especially where the temporary migrants do not establish any benefit entitlements.

The consequences of the potentially large cross-border flows of human capital on source countries have received scant attention from economists and political scientists. This Weatherhead Initiative is aimed at filling this void. For example, with regard to remittances and their effect on source countries, there is little systematic evidence about their economic and political consequences. There is a similar lacuna on the characteristics of observed emigrants given rich-country immigration policies. The research questions the team will analyze include the impact of the loss of scarce talent—especially people who would have played key roles in institution building—on the well being of “those left behind”; the fiscal impact of the lost portion of the skilled tax base; the effects of overseas networks as sources and...
facilitators of trade and investment, purveyors of remittances, as “brain banks” and as practitioners of long-distance nationalism” on the country of origin; and the effects of the loss of a dynamic segment of an emerging middle class on domestic politics.

In addition to the promise of a major conference in 2004, Weatherhead Initiative directors synthesize the conclusions of their individual studies, elaborate on their implications both for scholarship and public policy, and disseminate the knowledge gained in a variety of ways. In the case of the International Human Capital Flows project, the research team will document recent trends in temporary and permanent preference visas for skilled workers to develop a database on developed country immigration policies. It will conduct surveys in India and Peru designed to address some of the key research questions on the impact of emigration on source countries. In addition it will analyze an ongoing survey that interviews a random sample of 10,000 new U.S. immigrants and follows them for five years to obtain information on migration and remittance histories as well as on earnings of the immigrants in their home country prior to immigrating.

The Weatherhead Center sponsors and facilitates the execution of the Weatherhead Initiative in International Affairs to support large-scale innovative research on international economics, international relations, international security, comparative politics, political economy, and global studies. Previous Weatherhead Initiative grants have gone toward the study of military conflict as a public health problem, the role of identity—national, ethnic, religious and otherwise—in international and domestic politics, and the role of religion in global politics.

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and the implications for the future are too important to exclude force. While I can entirely understand that this should be a last resort, we are surely near that point now. Fortunately, I am from a country that is prepared to share the risks to its troops of international action alongside the United States, so I do not have to face the accusation that it is very easy to urge policies that do not risk my own nationals. Nevertheless, even if I had some other nationality I think I would be intellectually justified in making the same arguments.

Finally, I acknowledge the limits of my inspections of the state of Harvard debate. It is entirely possible that I have missed an excellent seminar or unpublished piece of research that satisfactorily addresses the wider considerations I have set out. If so, I would be entirely delighted to be corrected.
Each semester the Weatherhead Center holds a grant competition for Harvard student groups seeking funds to support projects and events that relate to international affairs. This past fall the Center awarded six small grants to undergraduate groups, which included:

- Harvard AIDS Coalition events that aim to raise undergraduate awareness of the global AIDS crisis.
- the Harvard Society of Arab Students for several events seeking to raise awareness among undergraduates about Arab peoples and issues.
- Harvard College Corps placements of students in volunteer jobs in developing countries.
- the Harvard Fair Trade Initiative’s fall speaker event on women and globalization.
- ZALACAIN, a student-run journal on Latin America, to support the publication of their next issue.

The Center also granted funds to two graduate student groups:

- organizers of the Harvard East Asia Society Graduate Student Conference, which took place in March 2003.
- students in the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures to support a conference entitled “RAF’s Germany: Terrorism, Politics, and Protest,” taking place in April 2003.