FROM THE DIRECTOR

In 1998, Dean Jeremy Knowles established an alumni-faculty committee to assess various aspects of planning for the development of international studies in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS). The committee co-chairs were Craig Burr ’66, Sana Sabbagh ’82, Professor William Kirby, and myself. The committee held six meetings during a span of three academic years and formally submitted its report to the Dean in August 2001. (It had discussed with the Dean its nearly final draft the previous March.)

The Dean’s charge to the committee focused on four concerns:

- The general approach to international studies and specifically the role of the FAS international and area studies centers;
- The study of languages other than English in Harvard College;
- The role of international students in the College and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (GSAS); and
- The role of international experience in undergraduate education (study abroad, overseas work, and internships).

The committee’s focus was, obviously, much wider than the specific concerns of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, but many of the issues that the committee addressed are pertinent to the Center. For example, in 2001-2002 the Center is supporting fourteen Undergraduate Associates who happen also to be international students at Harvard. Admittedly, the Center takes no notice of the citizenship or national origins of its student affiliates. We associate undergraduate and graduate students engaged in research on international issues because of the pertinence of their topics and the quality of their work, not their citizenship or their place of birth. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that many of the talented graduate and undergraduate students are citizens of countries other than the United States. Thus, the Center contributes substantially to the quality of experience of international students at Harvard and facilitates their contact with faculty, Fellows, and other students equally engaged in high-quality international research.

The Center is a polyglot’s dream. The languages of the intense conversations heard in these hallways seem as diverse as the world’s linguistic heterogeneity. It is a humbling experience for English-language monolinguals to realize that many of those associated with the Center—most notably many of the Fellows—speak several languages with ease, competence, and eloquence. Anyone who wishes to perfect a command of Uzbek, Japanese, or Arabic can practice it at the Center this academic year.

Beyond the Center, the committee’s report has already had some impact. Its strong recommendations urging the College to facilitate undergraduate study abroad for credit were a part of the decision begun in spring 2001 to review Harvard’s unduly restrictive and occasionally Byzantine impediments in this area. These recommendations were available

Continued page 11
New Terrain for civil society

Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr

Academics, politicians, foundation professionals, journalists, development experts, regimes and their opponents alike throughout the world have all joined the civil society bandwagon. Civil society’s most ardent advocates could not be more effusive: it is the silver bullet for all that ails us. Its detractors, on the other hand, dismiss the concept as too vague, too faddish, or too rooted in Western experience to be applicable elsewhere. But when used analytically to refer to that space between family and state in which social actors pursue neither profit within the market nor power within the state, civil society provides a powerful lens for analyzing associational landscapes cross-nationally.

In 1999, the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations embarked on a twelve-nation research project that examines civil societies across the Asia-Pacific region. As a first step, the Program collaborated with the East-West Center of Honolulu and Keio University of Tokyo to bring together a diverse set of scholars from several countries with a wide range of interests and fields of expertise to study civil society in Japan. Thanks to generous grants from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, Frank Schwartz, the Program’s associate director, and Susan J. Pharr, the Program’s director and Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, held a conference in January 2000 to gather contributors for a major research volume, The State of Civil Society in Japan, which will appear in early 2003. In its second stage, the project will, over the next two years, compare civil societies across the Asia-Pacific region, investigating how they are constituted and what role they play in democratic transitions.

Why focus initially on Japan in a project that encompasses the entire Asia-Pacific region? Because Japan was the first and remains the most prominent advanced industrial democracy in Asia, it represents an important model for the region. That said, Japan might not strike the casual observer as the most fertile ground for studying civil society. Even foreigners who know little else of the country are familiar with the Japanese proverb, “then all that sticks out gets hammered down.” Moreover, as encapsulated by the maxim, “respect for authorities, contempt for the people,” state-centric ideas are deeply rooted. Traditional norms called for the subordination of private considerations to public interests that only the bureaucracy could discern and act on. But these observations highlight how setting boundaries to the state and freeing space for plurality—the foci of a civil society approach—are key issues for Japan, and these issues have been intensely and widely debated by Japanese as well as by foreign scholars. In addition, the prevalence of similar norms in many other Asian nations makes the study of Japan’s civil society especially relevant.

To apply concepts that are Western in origin is not to deny the distinctiveness of Japan and, indeed, all of this project’s participants have something to say on that issue. Many observers assume that the development of civil society in Japan has been handicapped by what they regard as an unusually strong state, and we find some support for such a view. In the aftermath of the 1995 poison gas attack on Tokyo’s subway by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo, for example, Helen Hardacre, Reischauer Institute Professor of Japanese Religions and Society at Harvard, holds that state monitoring of religion has tightened, undermining its position in Japan’s civil society and effectively nullifying any capacity it had to restrain the state. Although the Internet has the potential to alter the situation, contends Laurie Freeman of the University of California at Santa Barbara, the mass media have frequently worked together with, or on behalf of, Japan’s political core to delimit rather than augment the discursive realm.

Professor Pharr, comparing the evolution of civil society in Japan and Western Europe, argues that the Japanese state has long adopted an activist stance vis-à-vis civil society, contouring the associational landscape with a variety of policy tools that give a green light to some groups (such as business
organizations) and ared light to others. On amicro
level, M argarita Estévez-Abe, assistant professor of
government at Harvard, maintains that the infor-
mal discretion enjoyed by Japanese bureaucrats
permits them to favor some associations at the
expense of others. Robert Pekkanen of M iddlebury
College demonstrates how state influence has re-
sulted in a plethora of small, local groups and a
dearth of large, professionalized, independent orga-
nizations. Kim Reimann, an advanced research
fellow for the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations
shows how state policies accounted for both the
way Japanese international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) long lagged behind their
Western counterparts and for the way they have
boomed since the mid-1980s.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to overem-
phasize state primacy. As David Johnson of the
University of H awaii at M anoa explains, portions of
the state apparatus like public prosecutors are actu-
ally more accountable in Japan
than in countries such as Italy.
Even in the extreme case of organi-
izations like farmers’ cooperatives and small enterprise
associations that originated from
top-down state directives in the
prewar era, Robert Bullock of the
University of California at River-
side points out, they may succeed
in winning independence over time by using the
countervailing leverage offered by competitive elec-
tions. The bottom line, Princeton’s Sheldon Garon
concludes, is that the Japanese state’s considerable
capacity to manage society has rested on the active
cooperation of many groups in civil society.

If civil society is conceptualized as a sphere
apart from the state and the market, its relationship
with the latter is logically as important as its relation-
ship to the former. Although the Western literature
tends to be state-centric, Andrew Barshay of the
University of California at Berkeley illustrates how postwar Japanese discussion of civil society has been inseparable from debates about the nature of Japa-
nese capitalism. Akira Suzuki of H osei University
explores how the hegemony of corporate manage-
ment and the integration of workers as members of
corporate communities rather than as citizens of
topolitical society as a whole have prevented Japanese
labor unions from becoming important actors in
civil society. Japan’s consumer movement has
struggled not only to represent the interests of its
constituency to state authorities, Patricia Maclachlan
of the University of Texas at Austin recounts, but also to educate individuals about their rights and
responsibilities as consumers and citizens in order to
build a consumer society that is independent of
market as well as state control.

What of the future? Civil society in Japan is
expanding and becoming more pluralistic. Yutaka
Tsujinaka of T sukuba University argues, gradually
moving away from the predominance of business
associationstypical of a developmental state. Toshio
Yamagishi of H okkaido University reveals how Ja-
pan is evolving at the interpersonal level from being
a security-based society in which individuals pursue
cautious, commitment-forming strategies to a trust-
based society in which individuals pursue more
open, opportunity-seeking strategies.

It bodes well for many countries in Asia and
elsewhere that Japan’s civil society, despite its check-
ered history, is now burgeoning. The postwar period
has been marked by strong trends toward ever-
greater participation and pluralization, with Japan’s
level of associational activity steadily catching up
with America’s. Professor Tsujinaka has found that
in 1960, Japan’s density of non-
profit associations was only one-
third that of the United States (11.1
associations per 100,000 people
versus 34.6). By 1991, however,
Japan had reached a level more
than 80 percent of America’s (29.2
versus 35.2). Aggregate pluraliza-
tion aside, the composition of the
interest-group sector has shifted
as the dominance of business groups has weakened.
The uneven distribution of resources and targeted
state policies may still favor established interest
associations, but newer, citizen-initiated movements
enjoy a dynamism and mass appeal that the former
lack. Coinciding with a decline in popular confidence
in government found until recently in virtually all the
advanced industrial democracies, the general public
and some leaders in Japan have concluded that the state
lacks the flexibility and resources to cope with
increasingly complex socioeconomic issues, and more
and more citizens have responded with their own
initiatives.

But for all the growth that civil society has
enjoyed in Japan, it still faces many obstacles, fore-

Japan may be the strictest of all advanced
industrial democracies in regulating the
incorporation of NGOs.
most among them a strict regulatory environment (a problem that is fairly pervasive across Asia). In Japan, organizations must obtain the status of “legal person” (hojin) to have legal standing. Although it is possible to operate without that status, groups lacking it cannot sign contracts, and that makes it impossible for them to do such things as open a bank account, own property or sign a lease for office space, or even lease a photocopy machine. The lack of legal standing may also deprive organizations of some of the social recognition they would otherwise win. Japan may be the strictest of all advanced industrial democracies in regulating the incorporation of NGOs. Into the 1990s, the civil code required that a “public-interest corporation”—the only formal option for a nonprofit organization (NPO)—operate for the benefit of society in general and not for the benefit of any specific group. Furthermore, bureaucrats could decide on a case-by-case basis at their own discretion whether to approve or reject applications for incorporated status.

The many hurdles they faced naturally discouraged organizations from incorporating. In contrast to the 1,140,000 groups to which the Internal Revenue Service had granted nonprofit status in the United States, only 26,089 Japanese groups had attained legal status as public-interest legal persons by the mid-1990s. As a result, unincorporated associations greatly outnumber public-interest corporations and include many of Japan’s most dynamic organizations. Unincorporated associations labor under financial handicaps, however. Public-interest corporations are exempt from the corporate income tax and the taxation of interest income. Unincorporated organizations do not enjoy these abatements. As for contributions, winning tax privileges is even more difficult than incorporating, and unincorporated organizations are altogether ineligible for tax-exempt contributions.

Despite these problems, there are numerous signs of civil society’s rise. The most dramatic demonstration of its growing prominence came in January 1995, when a powerful earthquake struck the city of Kobe, killing 6,430 people and forcing another 310,000 to evacuate their homes. The disparity between public and private responses to the disaster could not have been starker. Despite the devastation, jurisdictional disputes and red tape paralyzed the government’s relief efforts. Dismayed by the disorganization of the government’s efforts, some 1.3 million volunteers converged on the affected area to organize themselves spontaneously, and private donations amounted to about $1.3 billion.

Celebrating an “NPO boom” and a “volunteer revolution,” the mass media repeatedly, graphically, and invidiously compared the public and private responses to the catastrophe. The combined number of articles on NGOs and NPOs in Japan’s three largest dailies soared from 1,455 in 1994 to 2,151 in 1995, and it continued to rise thereafter. This media coverage helped spur the passage in 1998 of an NPO law that will enable thousands upon thousands of organizations to win legal status without subjecting themselves to stifling state regulation. As of late November 2001, 6,228 organizations had applied for such status, and 5,369 of those organizations had already been certified. The law represents a significant retreat from state claims to a monopoly over matters bearing on the public interest and at the same time confers on nonprofit activities the official imprimatur that has long been lacking.

Occurring as it has during the country’s decade-long economic quagmire, the recent surge in Japan’s civil society augurs well for other nations in Asia and elsewhere. Even in countries like Japan in which the state has shaped the associational landscape with a heavy hand, numerous forces (including rising educational levels, value change, growing affluence, information technology, and changing international norms) are creating more autonomous and pluralized civil societies.
Weatherhead Center Director **Jorge I. Domínguez**, Faculty Associate **Jeffrey Sachs**, and former Fellow and current President of Colombia **Andrés Pastrana** are among 100 individuals named as the most powerful and influential people in Latin America by Revista Poder in its December – January 2002 issue.

Member of the Weatherhead Center Executive Committee, Rev. **J. Bryan Hehir**, Professor of the Practice in Religion and Society and chair of the Executive Committee of Harvard’s Faculty of Divinity since December 1998, resigned as head of the Harvard Divinity School at the end of 2001 to become president and CEO of Catholic Charities USA, a network of more than 1,400 social-service agencies across the United States.

In April, a book by former Weatherhead Center Director and current Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, **Joseph Nye**, will be published by the Oxford University Press. In *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Professor Nye warns against “unilateralism, arrogance, and parochialism” in American foreign policy and discusses how the United States should define its interests in order to guide its foreign policy and the role that America should play in the world. (For more news on recent publications by Weatherhead Center-affiliated authors, click on “Books” at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu.)

**Jennifer Schirmer**, an affiliate of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival, has received a John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing Grant for her project “Protagonists of War: The Insurgents’ View. Memories and Justificatory Narratives of the Guatemalan Guerrilla Leaders and Cadre.”

Former Fellow (1975-76) **Sir Crispin Tickell** GCMB KCVO, pictured to the right, will be the inaugural Senior Visiting Fellow at the Harvard University Center for the Environment, with a week-long visit in April 2002 and three weeks in the fall semester. A former member of the British Diplomatic Service, Sir Crispin is currently the chancellor of the University of Kent at Canterbury; chairman of the Climate Institute; director of the Green College Centre for Environmental Policy and Understanding, University of Oxford; and chairman of the International Council of Scientific Unions Advisory Committee on the Environment.

Professor of Government **Lisa L. Martin**, Weatherhead Center Executive Committee member and faculty associate, is the new editor of International Organization, one of the leading scholarly journals of international affairs in the world. The journal presents seminal articles not only on international institutions and cooperation but also on economic policy issues, security policies, and other aspects of international relations and foreign policy. Topics covered include: trade policies and the GATT; environmental disputes and agreements; European integration; alliance patterns and war; bargaining and conflict resolution; economic development and adjustment; and international capital movements. Now published by The MIT Press for the IO Foundation, IO will soon be published by the Cambridge University Press. [http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/IO]

*We Were Soldiers*, a film based on the book, *We Were Soldiers Once... and Young*, written by Lt. General **Harold G. Moore** (Ret.), Fellow 1967-68, and reporter Joseph L. Galloway, about the battle of Ia Drang, Vietnam, was released on March 1, 2002, by Paramount Pictures. Directed by Randall Wallace, the film stars Mel Gibson as then Lt. Colonel Moore and focuses on Moore’s and Galloway’s experience when 450 U.S. soldiers in November 1965, early in the Vietnam War, found themselves surrounded by 2,000 North Vietnamese regulars in the Ia Drang Valley, in what became the first major battle of the extended conflict.
April 5-6
Informal Institutions and Politics in the Developing World
Chairs: Steven Levitsky and Gretchen Helmke

This conference will bring together leading scholars who work on informal institutions in various regions of the developing world, including Latin America, the former Soviet Union, and Asia. The gathering will treat a range of topics including corruption, clientelism and machine politics, the rule of law, executive-legislative relations, and the norms and practices that govern state bureaucracies, legislatures, and courts. An important objective of the conference will be to include scholars from multiple research traditions within political science, economics, and sociology. Their conversations will serve as the initial round of a larger project on informal institutions in Latin America.

April 12-13
Harvard Colloquium on International Affairs

The Third Annual Harvard Colloquium on International Affairs, a University-wide initiative focusing on a wide range of perspectives on major issues in contemporary international life, will take place on April 12 and 13 at the University. This year’s subject will be “Globalization after September 11: Has Anything Changed?”

June 14-16
Talloires, France

The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy

The Weatherhead Center will hold its annual conference in Talloires, France, on June 14-16, 2002, to address “The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy,” with Professor Stephen Walt of the John F. Kennedy School of Government as the faculty chair.
Gérard Dumont, a Fellow in 1984-85, died in Paris on December 1, 2001, at the age of 57 after a long illness. Mr. Dumont was educated at the University of Paris and was a career diplomat with the Foreign Ministry of France. He served in Tokyo, Antananarivo, São Paulo, and Abu Dhabi before coming to Harvard to analyze the decision-making processes of the United States in the field of foreign policy. Later in his career he was consul general in Houston, deputy chief of mission in New Delhi, consul general in Chicago—where he negotiated a Sister Cities agreement with Paris—and ambassador to Bolivia. Gérard Dumont served France on five continents, but the United States had a special place in his heart. He became a seasoned observer of the American political scene, playing a substantial role as a policymaker in the Quai d’Orsay’s Department of the Americas, and grew not only to have an intimate knowledge and understanding of American society, but a love for its people. He is well remembered for greeting French President Jacques Chirac in Chicago in the midst of a dreadful cold spell in February of 1996, delighting to the chance to introduce his President to America’s heartland. Gérard Dumont is survived by his wife Laure and three daughters.

Charles D. Nace, a Fellow in the Center’s third year, 1961-62, died on February 4, 2000, at the age of 83, in Virginia Beach. A 1939 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Nace carried out eight submarine patrols in the Pacific in World War II, the last two as commanding officer of USS RASHER SS-269. According to his wife, Pat, who survives him, “he was the youngest submariner to have command of a boat during the war.” He was a captain at the time of his residence at Harvard under the guidance of Ben Brown. Among his many naval duties, he served as the second senior member on the court of inquiry into the sinking, under circumstances that are still not fully understood or reported, of USS CORPION SSN-589, which was declared lost on June 2, 1968, with the death of 99 men when it sank west of Azores while in transit from the Mediterranean Sea. This was a service, according to Mrs. Nace, that represented “a particularly hard part of his career.” In 1971 Charles Nace retired from the Navy as a rear admiral after 36 years of service. At that time he was commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command, Panama.

Robert H. Mathams, a Fellow in 1971-72, died in Canberra on July 7, 2000, at the age of 79. Mr. Mathams was awarded the Military Cross for his service during World War II in the Finisterre Ranges of Papua New Guinea and soon gravitated toward a career in intelligence. He was given credit, early in his career, for correctly forecasting the uranium 235 basis of the first Chinese nuclear detonation, in 1964. Before becoming a Fellow, Mr. Mathams had progressed in his profession to become director of scientific and technical intelligence with the rank of assistant secretary in the newly created Australian Joint Intelligence Organisation. While at Harvard he pursued his lifelong interest in the scientific and technological development of China with an eye toward the threat of nuclear proliferation in Asia. In his 1982 book, Sub Rosa: Memoirs of an Australian Intelligence Analyst, Mr. Mathams argued that public recognition of the importance of intelligence analysis is a key element of the machinery of democratic government and the preservation of a free society. His wife died some years ago. He is survived by their three sons. (Source: Sydney Morning Herald)

Julian M. Sobin, a Fellow in 1987-88, died on August 24, 2001, at the age of 81, in Boston. Mr. Sobin was a 1941 graduate of Harvard College and during World War II served as a major in the U.S. Army. He saw nearly five years of field artillery and general staff service and was involved in combat in the China-India theater. Mr. Sobin was a longtime executive in the global chemical business, including chemical manufacturing and commerce. For many years he was chairman of his father’s company, Sobin Chemicals, and also served as senior vice president of the International Minerals & Chemical Corporation. Mr. Sobin was a trade adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and he served for 25 years on the Federal Advisory Committee on East-West Trade. In 1972 he was among the first American businessmen invited to visit Beijing, and he subsequently traveled to China on more than 50 occasions in the process of negotiating some 2,500 trade contracts. In recent years Mr. Sobin had served as the honorary Royal Nepalese consul general in Boston. He leaves his wife, Leila, and a son and daughter. (Source: Harvard Magazine)
Dignity Matters

Q: How should practitioners of conflict resolution address the complexity of the current situation we are facing in the international arena?

I believe that we need to pay closer attention to the human dimension of conflict—to the effect that it has on the inner world of human beings. One of the contributions of our work at PICAR has been to bring the issue of human needs into the political discourse about conflict—a discourse that has been historically dominated by the language of power, interests, and the state. While recognizing the importance and inevitability of the use of the paradigm of realpolitik to frame our thinking about conflict and its resolution, we have argued that the social-psychological perspective—the framework from which the human needs approach emerged—is one that can be viewed as a complement to power politics, though by no means as a substitute. It is but one dimension of the multitude of variables that contributes to the complexity that is inherent to the analysis of conflict.

The fundamental assumption of the human needs approach is that when their basic need for dignity is threatened, humans will react violently, if necessary, to restore it. Dignity is derived from fulfilling the need for identity, security, belonging, recognition, and justice. These needs are inviolable and cannot be negotiated away. No amount of power can suppress the desire to have the needs fulfilled. A army may eliminate the cadres fighting for the restoration of the needs, but it cannot eliminate the powerful human yearning to live one's life in dignity.

The main point here is to recognize another source of power. Power that is defined not by the strength of armies, sophistication of weapons, or the control of resources, but by the capacity of the human spirit to overcome even the most primal of human instincts—the instinct of self-preservation—in the service of the restoration of human dignity.

Q: How do you think this concern should influence domestic and international discourse relating to the events of September 11 and their aftermath?

At this juncture, as we continue to search for an understanding of the conditions that created the human tragedy that was brought on by the attacks of September 11, we are at an optimal moment in which to examine the importance of the “human dimension” of these events. That a small group of individuals had the capacity to inflict so much harm and devastation on the most powerful country in the world by such unconventional means—by engaging the power of the human spirit to overcome the fear of death for a higher calling—warrants our attention. In so doing, I am attempting to extend the analysis beyond this particular case of September 11 to the consequences of ignoring the human dimension in international politics in general.

Although I am fully aware and accepting of the many arguments that have been made to explain the motivation behind the behavior of the perpetrators of the attacks of September 11, ranging from the role of the internal oppressive conditions of many Arab states to the role of United States foreign policy in the Middle East vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, I suggest that it would be a mistake to dismiss the importance of the perception of a sustained threat to the dignity of those responsible for the attacks.

It is well documented in the literature of psychology that human beings often react to a threat to their well being with a defensive response. Daniel Goleman, in his book Emotional Intelligence, describes how the old brain (limbic system) becomes activated by threat, essentially taking over the activities of the neo-cortex, which is the part of the brain responsible for rational thought. These often violent, defensive behaviors that are triggered by threat include a desire for attack, revenge, and justice.
And it is not only a physical threat that can trigger such a response. James Gilligan, in his book *Violence*, argues that a psychological threat to one’s dignity—such as repeated experiences of humiliation—has the capacity to motivate some of the most heinous acts of violence. According to Gilligan, one of the best-kept secrets about the human condition is the extent to which we will avoid, at all cost, the experience of feeling humiliated and diminished. The power behind these defensive reactions—reactions that protect the challenged dignity of those threatened—is incalculable.

What I am suggesting is that those who organized and carried out the attacks of September 11 were reacting, in part, to the perception—whether real or imagined—that the United States is a threat to the dignity of the Arab world and more generally to Islam. In their minds, the U.S. policy in the Middle East has brought about the suffering of and injustice to the Palestinian people by not speaking out against Israel’s oppressive policies in the West Bank and Gaza. Added to that is their concern that the spread of American influence and culture throughout the Muslim world threatens their fundamental identity as Muslims, as well as their way of life. By linking these threats to their dignity to a fanatical interpretation of Islam, which enabled them to murder innocent citizens of the world—albeit mostly U.S. citizens—they justified a most cruel act of inhumanity in the service of a higher calling.

The main point is that we cannot afford to ignore what is happening at the human level in international politics. The effects of our actions, motivated predominantly by self-interest, will incite consequences at the human level that would normally be considered irrelevant to international politics. The conceptualization of power in international discourse needs to acknowledge the power of the human spirit to commit the most unthinkable acts of inhumanity when provoked by a threat to dignity. One does not even need to argue this from a moral perspective. It is sufficient to say that on pragmatic grounds it is not in the interest of any government to violate the dignity not only of its own people but also of any other people within the international community. The effects of humiliation can travel far beyond national borders. The way we treat one another matters, whether the unit of analysis is international politics or interpersonal relations. Violating the dignity of human beings has its consequences. The question is whether we want to live in a world where we must be constantly at the ready for the next big threat or, rather, that we tap into another qualitatively different form of strength, which is the strength that it takes to overcome the power of the cycle of rage, revenge, and retaliation. The strength that it takes to restrain the instinctive impulse to fight back requires an internal source of power that weapons and armies cannot touch. It is this untapped and underused strength that we are capable of as humans, which could unleash courage and restraint rather than rage, and shift the destructive dynamics in which we are currently entangled.

Q: How do you suggest that Americans begin to remedy the situation in which they find themselves?

While acknowledging the need to protect ourselves during this time of crisis, I suggest that it behooves us to think carefully about developing a new relationship to power. As the world’s greatest superpower, defined in conventional terms, we would choose to tap into that other source of strength—that would enable us to put an end to the cycle of violence and develop policies both at home and abroad that are genuinely committed to preserving the dignity of all human beings. This new relationship to power would require a level of awareness and acceptance of the impact of our actions on one another and force us to examine closely the consequences of policies that are driven by self-interest alone. This new relationship to power would require us to develop the capacity for empathy for those who are less fortunate than we, especially for those who are trapped in human suffering as a consequence of abuses of power and domination by one group over another. It would require an awareness of the power of including others in one’s analysis of interests; the power of acknowledging injustice rather than turning a blind eye to it; the power of recognizing, accepting, and taking responsibility for one’s blind spots and the harmful consequences of them on others. This new relationship to power would give us the moral courage to make the choices that would bring out the best rather than the worst in one another. And I would argue that the “best” is yet to come, that we have only begun to explore what we are capable of, guided by a balanced view of both the privileges and responsibilities that power brings.

Paradoxically, the greatest privilege that power provides is the opportunity to use it in the service of the restoration of humanity, for to preserve it for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many only traps us in the self-centered illusion that what matters to us, alone, is the only thing that counts. This awareness opens us up to the value of exploring possibilities that, by bringing out the best in one another, we can get down to the business of flourishing as human beings rather than expending all of our resources and energy on protecting ourselves from the next big threat. And the good news is that all we have to do is find the courage to make the choice.
The Weatherhead Center Student Council has been enjoying an extremely successful year on all fronts thanks to outstanding commitment from the members of its Board and great willingness shown by the Fellows and the Center’s staff to reach out to the undergraduate community. Essential new ground has been broken, with undergraduates becoming more aware of the Weatherhead Center, its people, and resources. Wonderful attendance at the open house held as an orientation session for undergraduates in early October is but one indicator of this.

A few activities that the Council has sponsored over the past year deserve special mention. A series of events in the aftermath of September 11 provided a much-needed forum for discussion and debate on post-crisis issues. The council held several panel discussions that included Professors Samuel Huntington, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Michael Ignatieff and others. Also, a series of dinners with the Center’s Fellows provided important fora for the discussion of issues pertaining to U.S. military and foreign policy.

The greatest achievement of 2001 was International Careers Week held in late November. Reviving a Student Council specialty from previous years, the Board was pleasantly surprised by the popularity of this undertaking. The Student Council, along with the International Law Journal of the Harvard Law School, Harvard College’s International Relations Council, the International Development Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Bhumi, the Harvard (undergraduate) International Development Group, began the week by conducting a series of five panel discussions on international careers. These were held in undergraduate houses, with attendance averaging approximately 60 to 80 students at every panel.

The International Careers Dinner brought the week to a delightful conclusion. A majority of the Weatherhead Center Fellows, as well as numerous Nieman and Institute of Politics Fellows, attended and shared thoughts with undergraduates on careers in international relations. An outstanding plethora of keynotespeakers, including ambassador and former CFIA Fellow Monteagle Stearns (1972-73); Lucy Reed, a partner of the international law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer; and George Hoguet, head of the Boston-based State Street Global Advisers’ active and emerging-markets team, inspired the students with tales of far-away countries and (possible) fame and fortune.

None of these events would have been possible without the Weatherhead Center Fellows, who always managed to find time for encounters with undergraduates. Members of the Weatherhead Center staff also merit special thanks for assisting the Council. It would not be an exaggeration to say that discussion of issues pertaining to international relations would be almost nonexistent at the undergraduate level if not for these two groups of people. We can only hope that the relationship between the undergraduates and the Weatherhead Center will grow in strength in the future so that students may learn more and the Center’s scholars sleep less.

~ Leonid V. Peisakhin
served as Student Council president in 2001.
The committee report has provided further impetus for inter-Center collaboration. Some changes have already begun, in part, as a direct result of the report. We now expect that all FAS international and area studies Centers will collaborate regarding undergraduate summer senior thesis research travel grants. With GSAS leadership, we plan to launch a parallel graduate student common application for various forms of support from the international and area studies Centers.

Challenges remain. The Centers do cooperate to some extent regarding the scheduling of seminars and conferences, but more can be done. The Centers inform each other too little and rarely in a timely fashion regarding the appointments of visiting scholars or Fellows drawn from the worlds of government, business, or the professions. The Centers housed in our proposed new buildings and in the old houses we hope to renovate will be required to fashion a process to reallocate office space depending on changing university, scholarly, and pedagogical priorities.

The Weatherhead Center is a jewel in the crown of international research at this University and in the world. Consistent with its mission, the Center already plays a constructive role in facilitating aspects of the international tasks of the College and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. The Center has played a leading role in fostering inter-Center coordination in the recent past, and it is again doing so to implement the recommendations just noted.

We expect to serve faculty, students, Fellows, and visiting scholars more effectively and more efficiently and with a sustained, high level of professional quality. This is a difficult task, but it is one we must undertake.

Jorge I. Domínguez
Director
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