FROM THE DIRECTOR

The Weatherhead Center’s Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) will close on July 31, 2003, after a long, productive, and distinguished trajectory under the leadership of Professor Herbert Kelman. PICAR was born from the brain, heart, and lived experiences of Herb Kelman and his research on social psychology as applied to international topics. Since the 1970s, Kelman’s empirical focus has been the Middle East and PICAR has long been known for its work with and between Israelis and Palestinians.

PICAR has sought to advance understanding of international and intergroup conflicts and to develop interactive problem-solving processes to address such conflicts effectively. PICAR’s work has been based on the premise that international conflict is intersocietal as well as intergovernmental and that diplomacy at its best seeks to integrate official and unofficial efforts.

PICAR has also attempted to integrate research, practice, and education. Much of its work has been carried out through problem-solving workshops. Members of communities in conflict have met for intensive three to four day periods to engage in “joint thinking” about solutions to the problems that divide them. Such joint thinking has been promoted by choosing the participants carefully, developing clear ground rules, and bringing the basic human needs of identity and security to the fore of the political discussion.

PICAR’s role at the old Center for International Affairs developed somewhat imperceptibly. The Annual Report 1977-1978 is the first to mention Kelman’s work under the rubric of “The Middle East,” noting his role as co-chairman of the Center’s Middle East seminar—a leadership role he has retained ever since. The report notes Kelman’s focus on the “social and psychological dimensions of the conflict” in the Middle East and his “development of an international approach to conflict resolution.” But it goes on to say that Kelman also served as distinguished visiting professor at the American University in Cairo where he lectured on both his research interests and his analysis of the psychological impact on Israeli society of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977—which he witnessed personally. He also lectured at the al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and the Egyptian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy. In passing, the same annual report notes Kelman’s extracurricular activities: During that year, he completed his term as president of the International Studies Association, began his term as chairman of the American Sociological Association’s section on social psychology, and continued his term as president of the Inter-American Society of Psychology.

PICAR was established formally as a Center program in July 1993. Joseph Nye was Center director, Kelman became PICAR director, and Eileen Babbitt, who had been working for some years on research and workshops in association with Kelman, became PICAR deputy director. The Annual Report, 1992-1993 describes PICAR at Continued page 2
From the Director ...

its birth when, of course, it was already a mature research and practice program. PICAR’s goal was “dedicated to a combination of theory building, research, and practice in unofficial approaches to the resolution of international and intercommunal conflicts.” The program would “promote a multidisciplinary orientation to the analysis and resolution of international and ethnic conflicts... explore the relationship between unofficial and official processes in diplomacy and negotiation and ... strengthen the link between theory and practice. PICAR would continue to develop its trademark activities, namely, “to design, implement, refine, and evaluate problem-solving workshops... develop a network of scholars and practitioners trained in conflict analysis and third-party intervention capable of addressing... regional and intercommunal conflicts... and... distill from these experiences relevant contributions to the policy-making process.” Its focus remained the Arab-Israeli conflict but its members engaged as well on problems in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Armenia, indigenous communities in Canada. Soon thereafter, PICAR launched its work on Sri Lanka, and years later the Program would add work on Colombia and U.S.-Cuban relations.

PICAR is unimaginable without Herb Kelman, but one of his talents has been to find, support, and work with excellent colleagues who have advanced the Program’s broad interests. From its formal foundation, Dr. Donna Hicks has played a key role leading many of PICAR’s endeavors, especially the Program’s multi-year work on Sri Lanka. Hicks and her associates organized PICAR workshops with influential members of Sri Lanka’s two principal political parties from the Sinhalese community to seek ways to resolve the two decade long civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. She would in time become PICAR’s deputy director, a role she retained through this day, as well as co-chair and then chair of the Program’s seminar on international conflict analysis and resolution.

Similarly, Professor Nadim Rouhana, who is also a Weatherhead Center associate, has been one of PICAR’s stalwarts over the years, co-directing with Kelman the Program’s joint Israeli-Palestinian Working Group. This group was composed of influential members from both communities. Rouhana also for several years co-chaired the Program’s seminar on international conflict analysis and resolution—an endeavor that has also been well served by Dr. Brian Mandell.

PICAR stimulated, supported, and helped to train many postdoctoral researchers as well as graduate and undergraduate students. It drew vigorously and effectively from the Center’s Fellows Program and other programs at the Center to advance its twin objectives of research and practice and to foster open, creative, and multidisciplinary thinking.

PICAR has been supported from the start by grants from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. This Foundation’s generous support has been exemplary, for it has been reliable, persistent, and encouraging, enabling PICAR researchers and staff to engage in their best work as they sought to foster the practices and principles that animated this remarkable team of people over the years.

Herb Kelman is one of the leading social psychologists of our time. His scholarly work on the processes of social influence—compliance, identification, and internalization—had extraordinary impact on professional life. His work on the social psychology of obedience is a major social psychological contribution to the study of genocide and sanctioned massacres. His research on the social psychological foundations and dimensions of international behavior is a cornerstone for the social scientific study of international relations. His commitment to the scholarly study and the practical advancement of peace has been the guiding light of his professional life.

During the last quarter century, he refocused his colossal scholarly and personal energies on the promotion of the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Through his work at and through the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, he pioneered in fostering dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. His workshops brought together influential personalities from both sides of the conflict where participants could emerge as human beings, still committed to their respective views but enabled to listen directly to the concerns of the other. Participants in Kelman’s workshops, often for the first time in their lives, were able to present their own views and observe instantly how the other heard them.

Herbert Kelman is a scholar of great distinction, unassuming in his personal style, passionately devoted to the process of making peace an actual possibility, and thoroughly dedicated to these endeavors in the Middle East. Born in Vienna, a citizen of the United States, a man respectful of the world’s varieties and particularities, Herb has also enriched our life and work at the Weatherhead Center. He is not just ours, for he belongs to the legions of colleagues, students, and friends he has made here and all over the world, but we are proud nonetheless to call him one of us, and we are grateful for his leadership, talents, and accomplishments in the past, now, and in the years to come.
The Weatherhead Center's program for Graduate Student Associates (GSAs) facilitates and supplements students' independent research toward doctoral and advanced professional degrees. Program members come from many of Harvard's academic departments and professional schools to work on projects related to the core research interests of the Center. These interests are broadly defined to include research on international, transnational, and comparative topics (both contemporary and historical) including rigorous policy analysis, as well as the study of countries and regions other than the United States. Steven Levitsky, assistant professor of government, is the director of graduate student programs.

The 2003-04 Graduate Student Associates, departmental affiliations, and dissertation topics are:

**Daniel Aldrich**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. Investigating how states learn from their interaction with citizens who resist attempts to construct state supported but often controversial facilities like nuclear power plants, airports, and dams.

**Tahmima Anam**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Anthropology. An ethnographic study of the Bangladesh war of independence with an emphasis on the relationship between peasant freedom fighters and urban guerrilla youth during the independence movement, a relationship that has been neglected in the historiography of the Bangladesh war.

**Warigia Bowman**  

**Christian Brunelli**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. How politics influences the development of institutions governing policing organizations in Japan, and the emergence of cooperative relationships between the police and their respective communities.

**Michael Burscher**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of History and East Asian Languages. Idealism and ideology under the Meiji State: intellectual elites and the political significance of philosophy in Meiji Japan.

**Mark Copelovitch**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. An exploration of how domestic politics within the industrialized countries shaped international responses to financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s.

**Fotini Christia**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government. A theoretical approach to explain the variation among refugee (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) return policies pursued by the different political elites in post-war Bosnia.

**Haley Duschinski**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Anthropology. Social experiences of violence and displacement among Kashmiri Hindu migrants living in temporary conditions in Delhi, India.

**Nicola Gennaioli**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Economics. A study of the interplay of capital and precapitalist institutions in Africa, specifically with regard to private contracting and the organization of judicial systems.

**Daniel Gingerich**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. Causes of administrative reform in multiparty presidentialist systems in Latin America using a theoretical framework that combines a focus on pre-electoral coalition formation and illicit party financing.

**Michael Horowitz**  
(also a predissertation grant recipient)  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. Cross-national differences in evaluations of power undermine the assumptions of current deterrence research. This study will utilize qualitative case studies and statistical analysis to build a more accurate way of predicting deterrence failures.

**Andrew Kennedy**  

**Jee Young Kim**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Sociology. A study of the variations in labor practices among Korean-funded firms in Vietnam's footwear industry, which is explained by interfirm relations and global labor-rights movements.

**John Ondrovick**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of History. An exploration of the new cultural meanings and structures that arose out of civil war violence in Germany and Russia from 1918 to 1923.

**Abena Osseo-Asare**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of History of Science. Documentation of phyto-medical research in Ghana since 1850 in the context of the popular use of herbal medicine, tracing interactions between scientists and herbalists working to understand potent medicinal plants.

**Moria Paz**  
S.J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School. The point of juncture between non-territorially-defined ethnic communities and international law and diasporic networks as they provide a novel model for international collaborative systems.

**Kira Petersen**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. A comparison of the issues that arise in democratic disputes with the issues that arise in disputes between other dyads, examining how these issues affect conflict resolution.

**David Singer**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. An analysis of the international harmonization of domestic regulations in the areas of money laundering, banking, insurance, securities, and accounting.

**Naunihal Singh**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. The development and testing of a theory concerning when attempted coups fail and when they succeed.

**Allison Brownell Tirres**  
(also a predissertation grant recipient)  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of History, and J.D. candidate at the Harvard Law School. A study of the legal history of the United States-Mexico borderlands, with a focus on border residents and their experiences with legal institutions in an international zone.

**Lily Tsai**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. An investigation of local governance and the provision of public goods in rural China.

**Etienne Yehoue**  
(Sydney R. Knafel Dissertation Completion Fellow)  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Economy and Government. The economics and politics of currency union and country risk-sharing, with a particular interest in the emergence and stability of currency blocs and the dynamic of bloc expansion and foreign direct investment in Central and West Africa.

The first Asian-American to be appointed as an ambassador (to Nepal), Julia Chang Bloch (1988-89) is now executive vice chairman of Beijing University's American Studies Center. Timothy Buchanan (1985-86) serves as chief of the Northeast Asia Branch of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Formerly a professor at the Fletcher School, Robert Dohner (1988-89) has returned to Washington as the senior Japan adviser at the Treasury Department after spending years in Tokyo. Hiroshi Hirabayashi (1981-82) is now Japan's ambassador to India. Thomas Hout (1983-84) is a senior advisor at The Boston Consulting Group. Ambassador Tadashi Ikeda (1982-83) heads Japan's embassy to Brazil.


*Asian names are presented here in the Western style, surname last.
October 3-4
The International Diffusion of Political and Economic Liberalization
Chairs: Beth Simmons and Frank Dobbin
The final third of the twentieth century was marked by a considerable trend toward economic and political liberalization in many parts of the world. The purpose of this conference is to explore (a) whether, and (b) how international diffusion has played a role in the spread of liberalization over the course of the past few decades. The papers presented explore both patterns of policy convergence or divergence globally, as well as the processes that might explain such patterns.

late October
The Politics of Globalization: How Citizens, Firms, and Workers Respond to International Market Forces
Chairs: Margarita Estevez-Abe and Michael J. Hiscox
The purpose of this conference is to launch a new collaborative research project that will gather data on responses to globalization among firms and workers in the advanced economies. The conference will bring together those involved in the long-term project for an initial set of discussions of the core substantive and measurement issues. It will provide the basis for an initial design of the survey and interview instruments and for a new grant proposal for major funding for the next stage of the research.

November 7-9
Conference on Social Capital and Well-Being
Chairs: Robert Putnam and John F. Helliwell
This conference will bring together scholars (economists, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists) who have been doing empirical research on the determinants and social context of subjective well-being ("happiness"). The conference is intended to develop new individual and collaborative research agendas focused on the linkages between social capital and well-being, and is timely for several reasons. First, the research area is just opening up at the junction of two very active areas of interdisciplinary scholarship, with resulting value in bringing together researchers who have not yet had the chance for discussions and joint work. Second, research results already in hand suggest that placing social capital research in the context of the analysis of subjective well-being will help to clarify a number of key policy issues, not only in the developed world, but also in developing societies. Preliminary results suggest that the well-being effects of differences in social capital and related variables may be even larger than the effects of the gaps in per-capita incomes that are much more commonly the focus of national economic policy and development assistance.

November 20-22
Fellows’ Alumni Conference and Reunion
Every two years the Fellows Program organizes a gathering of program alumni to address current issues of global concern. This year’s conference is entitled, “America’s Role in the World Today,” and topics to be considered include: American national identity, challenges for America’s foreign policymakers, ensuring regional security, and trade policy and the global economy.

December 6
Research Group on Political Institutions and Economic Policy (PIEP)
Chairs: Jeffry Frieden and Kenneth Shepsle
Over the past 25 years, two separate strands of research in political economy have developed. The first is the rigorous analysis of the impact of political institutions on political behavior and political outcomes. The second is the analysis of the making of economic policy, which has tried to develop theoretically consistent and empirically grounded explanations of economic policy outcomes. Typically, they have developed entirely segregated from each other: the analysis of political institutions without concern for economic policymaking implications, and the study of economic policymaking with limited attention to the institutional environment in which it takes place. The goal of this conference is to encourage the development of an approach to politics and policymaking that is theoretically rigorous and empirically systematic with regard to both political institutions and economic factors.

On April 26 Weatherhead Center faculty associate and executive committee member Lisa Martin hosted the first in a series of workshops on the topic of delegation of authority to international organizations. The workshops bring together a group of some twenty scholars engaged in theoretical and empirical research explaining the cause and consequences of delegation of authority from member states to international organizations and institutions.

For more information on Weatherhead Center conferences, please visit the Center’s Web site at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu and click on conferences.
Targeting Civilians in Wartime

by Alexander B. Downes

Why do states sometimes target and kill civilians intentionally in war? According to one estimate, of the nearly 110 million war-related deaths in the twentieth century alone, 56 percent were civilians. Noncombatants died in the greatest numbers in the twentieth century, but the practice of brutalizing civilians in wartime is, as Caleb Carr notes, “as old as warfare itself.” Athens and Melos, Rome and Carthage, and the rampages of Attila the Hun, Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane across Europe and Central Asia all suggest that, as one scholar puts it, “the average war … has not been very ‘just’, as far as the killing of unarmed civilians was concerned.” The recent attention devoted to “collateral damage”—civilian casualties resulting from attacks aimed at military targets—obscures the fact that such incidents actually killed relatively few noncombatants. Most civilians die because someone is trying to kill them. The question is, why?

Despite the extent of the carnage, our understanding of why civilians die in such large numbers during war remains limited. A number of recent studies, however, suggest that the major perpetrators are authoritarian states. According to emerging conventional wisdom, autocracies—free of domestic institutional constraints and prone to be run by leaders not shy about killing to get their way—are more likely to engage in genocide or mass killing of civilians. A combination of liberal norms and democratic institutions, on the other hand, constrain democracies from brutalizing noncombatants. Liberal norms, for example, prohibit the harming of innocent individuals, even enemy civilians in wartime. Democratic institutions force leaders to be mindful of public opinion in making foreign policy choices. Just as fighting a costly war—or even worse, losing one—is a policy likely to result in a leader’s repudiation at the ballot box, killing large numbers of civilians in combat operations is liable to provoke public censure, possibly leading to the loss of elected office by the officials responsible. Finally, liberal democracies are presumably the type of regime most sensitive to international ethical norms prohibiting intentional or disproportionate harm to noncombatants because democracies themselves abide by similar norms domestically.

Some recent evidence supports the view that democracies go to great lengths to protect civilians from harm in wartime. The number of civilians killed by aerial bombardment in the last three wars fought by the United States, for example, has dropped precipitously: the figure was 65,000 in the Vietnam War; fell to 3,000 in the first Gulf war, and reached only 500 in the war over Kosovo (although it increased slightly to 1,000 to 1,300 in Afghanistan). In none of these campaigns, moreover, were civilians the direct object of air attack. Wars waged by other democracies in the past thirty years show similar restraint. In the 1982 Falklands War, for example, Britain killed a total of five Argentine civilians. Examples can also be found in the distant past: U.S. forces did not target noncombatants in the Mexican War (1846-48), nor did the British do so in colonial wars when they confronted adversaries who fought conventionally with regular armies, such as the Sikhs in India or the Zulus in sub-Saharan Africa.

Disturbingly, however, examples of democracies victimizing civilians in war—sometimes on a massive scale—spring readily to mind. The Anglo-American naval blockade in World War I contributed to the deaths of half a million German civilians, while the Allied strategic bombing campaigns of World War II killed hundreds of thousands of Axis noncombatants. Israel used targeted terror against Arab civilians in its war of independence, resulting in the flight of about 750,000 people, and killed as many as 10,000 Lebanese noncombatants in the siege of Beirut in 1982. Nor have democracies always been humane in their conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns, as exemplified by the Second Boer War (1899-1902), U.S.–Filipino War (1899-1902), wars by the French and Americans in Indochina (1945-54 and 1965-73), and the French-Algerian War (1954-62).

Indeed, my own research shows that when a large sample of wars is examined, democracies are slightly more likely than non-democracies to target civilians, although the difference is not great enough to be significant in statistical terms. I examined every interstate war since 1815, a total of 97 armed conflicts involving 316 countries. The results of this analysis were surprising: 26 percent of

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the democracies intentionally targeted civilians, compared to only sixteen percent of the autocracies.

Thus we are left with a paradox. Liberal democracies respect the rights of their citizens to be free from arbitrary violence domestically and loudly condemn the human-rights violations of other states. But when democracies go to war, they, too, may target and kill enemy civilians, not only through occasional massacres but also by systematic killing, sometimes in large numbers. What explains this puzzling empirical finding? Why do all types of states seemingly behave similarly when it comes to their treatment of enemy civilians in war?

States tend to target noncombatants in wartime when defensive advantages on the battlefield cause (or threaten to cause) armed conflicts to become costly, protracted wars of attrition. States are sensitive to costs and seek to minimize the loss of human life and the time it takes to achieve their war objectives. Furthermore, leaders and ordinary citizens are predisposed to favor the lives of their own people over those in other states. According to a recent survey by the International Red Cross, overwhelming majorities of people in all types of societies and cultures believe that purposefully targeting civilians or failing to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants is wrong. But when their state actually gets into a fight, these attitudes change: people become willing to breach the laws of war and sacrifice the lives of enemy civilians if doing so promises to ensure the survival of their own state or preserve the lives of their soldiers. Political leaders, too, are pulled towards conserving the lives of their own citizens, even if this means sacrificing innocents on the other side. As George Kennan once put it, “Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents.” The interests of mankind as a whole rate, if anything, a distant second.

But why attack civilians? How does targeting them contribute to victory? When human costs escalate or appear to loom on the horizon, or when wars bog down into prolonged struggles, governments seek to shorten the war and lower their own casualties, while still endeavoring to attain their objective. Unfortunately for civilians, targeting noncombatants offers a way to achieve both of these goals. On the one hand, civilians’ morale and willingness to support a war effort is thought to decrease when they are attacked. This logic was most famously articulated by Italian interwar air theorist Giulio Douhet who—ironically, in hindsight—called for punishing air attacks on urban centers as a way to shorten wars and make them more humane. The population, in his view, unable to withstand the terror and destruction of aerial attack, would rise up and demand an end to the war. But targeting civilians can degrade not only the enemy’s will to continue the struggle but also its ability to fight. The rationale behind the American firebombing of Japanese cities in the Pacific War, for example, was to incapacitate Japan’s war economy not by destroying factories, which were too hard and costly to hit, but by killing industrial workers so there would be no one to work in the plants. Finally, targeting civilians also accomplishes the straightforward goal of removing them from a particular piece of territory.

In practice, these various motivations translate into two general forms of civilian victimization. Coercive victimization occurs in protracted wars of attrition, both conventional and guerrilla, as costs escalate and each side searches for ways to convince the other to abandon the struggle. Violence against civilians in this scenario is not intended to wipe out entire populations but rather is a tool to coerce the enemy leadership to give up. In conventional wars coercive victimization takes the form of aerial bombardment of civilians or naval blockade and siege designed to starve civilian populations.

Eliminationist victimization, on the other hand, occurs in wars of conquest or when a war erupts between intermingled groups within one state. It tends to happen immediately rather than escalate over time because one or both sides expect high future costs of occupation, believing that a particular group cannot be reconciled to its rule and represents a permanent threat of revolt. Therefore, the attacker moves preemptively to eliminate that group via expulsion or, in extreme circumstances, mass murder. Eliminationist victimization often takes the form of ethnic cleansing but also occurs in the advanced stages of guerrilla wars when one side believes that the civilian population is inadmissibly committed to supporting its opponent.
Kashmiri Hindu migrants remember their homes through complex stories, marked by traumas as well as continuities. Whereas nationalist forms of historical discourse in South Asia identify the past, present, and future of Kashmir Valley in terms of moral certitude, these migrants' stories produce an unstable and shifting territory, an inconstant homeland that may be inhabited in various ways by myriad speakers and subjects. James Clifford has written that diasporic populations present "potential subversions of nationality—ways of sustaining connections with more than one place while practicing nonabsolutist forms of citizenship" (Routes 1997: p 9). Accordingly, my research attends to the ways in which stories about Kashmir challenge the assumption that Kashmiri Hindus are deeply rooted to their homeland in straightforward and uniform ways. Their stories about the past, produced by the processes of displacement itself, open possibilities of reconciliation in the future.

Kashmiri Hindu migrants in Delhi collectively identified their moment of displacement as the mass exodus from Kashmir Valley in 1989-1990, during a few months that were marked by the intensification of militant activity, the emergence of conspiracy theories and panic rumors, and the imposition of governor's rule in the state. When asked directly about the circumstances by which they came to Delhi, migrants often told stories that corresponded to this pattern, stories that varied only slightly from one another in details of the final threat that pushed them across the border. These stories had a routinized quality, as if the narrators, through years of interviews with human rights workers, government representatives, journalists, and anthropologists, had gradually learned to relate accounts of displacement that satisfied their listener's expectations. On other occasions, however, Kashmiri migrants would relate different kinds of stories—stories featuring other breaking points, transformations, and displacements that did not correspond to their families' physical departures from the Valley. Sometimes this rup-
antiques,” he said, “and this house is my antique. When the time comes, I will sell it as an antique.”

Rather than waxing nostalgic, Rajiv Tikoo would often tell ironic stories about the home that he and his family had abandoned in Srinagar city. By self-consciously describing his house as an antique, Rajiv Tikoo was relegating it to a particular time and place, encapsulating it in the world of “traditional Kashmiri culture” that could never again be recovered or retrieved. As a businessman he knew that such objects have value in the modern world, that their meaning derives from the very fact that they have withstood the ravaging violence of history. He also knew that such designation would foreclose the possibility of return. After all, it is impossible to re-inhabit antiquity.

In a sense, Kashmiri Hindu migrants speak a great deal about their memories of home and homeland. They tell stories about the good times in these familiar places—the time a younger brother got drunk at his sister’s wedding and stumbled from his rooftop onto a mound of grass in the yard below; the summer afternoons that a girl and her brother sat on their balcony, watching foreign visitors tour their village during the Sunday mela; the time a grandmother fell ill and traveled by car the familiar route to Shankarcharya, where she drank the fresh spring water and became well. They also tell stories about the bad times, when masked men came in the middle of the night, and these same rooftops and balconies and well-worn routes served as means of escape from danger.

Kashmiri Hindus tell these stories often and with great detail. At the same time, though, they realize they will be unable to reclaim exactly that which they have lost. The possibility of making a future home in Kashmir will require more than a reconstruction grant from the central government, more even than the promise of safe return from state authorities. It requires the negotiation of new definitions of territoriality, subjecthood and the state within and across contested borders. The impossibility of recovering the past demands new ways of imagining the future of Kashmir Valley within and between postcolonial states.

Their homes emptied of meaning, Kashmiri migrants challenge the very notion of national citizenship as they imagine their futures in Kashmir. This challenge lies within their repertoires of stories about the past, available for reconfiguration under circumstances of displacement. The narratives of citizenship that have attached them to their land no longer seem to make sense; perhaps they never did. Through the work of stories, Kashmiri migrants are imagining new relationships among territoriality, subjecthood, and the state in order to inhabit anew their inconstant homeland.

I saw, there is nothing! This gate, this main door is there, that is locked. That is just it. (He started to laugh, so hard that he could barely continue.) You can think there was something, maybe some structure was there, it is still...

The door, I said, — oh the whole building is gone!

Whole building is gone. Only the main door is standing. And locked. (He continued to laugh.) Whole building is gone, they have destroyed it.

Like Rajiv Tikoo, Vijay Raina sees the irony of his situation, rejecting reductive understandings of home and homeland. For him, the possibility of living in Kashmir requires more than a reconstruction grant from the central government, more even than the promise of safe return from state authorities. It requires the negotiation of new definitions of territoriality, subjecthood and the state within and across contested borders. The impossibility of recovering the past demands new ways of imagining the future of Kashmir Valley within and between postcolonial states.

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The author, right, is pictured here with Rajiv Tikoo outside the Kashmir Hut at the Kashmiri Migrant Market in New Delhi.
Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America
Second edition
edited by Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter

Since the first edition of the acclaimed Constructing Democratic Governance was published in 1996, the democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone significant change. This new, one-volume edition, edited by Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter, offers a concise update to current scholarship in this important area of international studies. The book is divided into two parts: Themes and Issues, and Country Studies. Countries not covered by individual studies are discussed in the introduction, conclusion, and thematic chapters. In the introduction, Michael Shifter provides an overview of new developments in Latin America and the Caribbean, with particular emphasis on civil society and problems of governance. The conclusion, by Jorge I. Domínguez, ties together the themes of the various chapters and discusses the role of parties and electoral politics.

Jorge I. Domínguez is the director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University.

Stalled Democracy
Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development
by Eva Bellin

In this ambitious book Eva Bellin examines the dynamics of democratization in late-developing countries where the process has stalled. Bellin focuses on the pivotal role of social forces and particularly the reluctance of capital and labor to champion democratic transition, contrary to the expectations of political economists versed in earlier transitions. Bellin argues that the special conditions of late development, most notably the political paradoxes created by state sponsorship, fatally limit class commitment to democracy. In many developing countries, she contends, those who are empowered by capitalist industrialization become the allies of authoritarianism rather than the agents of democratic reform.

Bellin generates her propositions from close study of a singular case of stalled democracy—Tunisia. The author’s explanation of that case is made more general through comparison with the cases of other countries, including Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Egypt.

Eva Bellin is an associate professor of government and a faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
Targeting Civilians in Warfare...

Certain factors tend to favor defense over attacking, which results in costlier wars. When these factors exist, civilian victimization is more likely. They include: (1) an even military balance; (2) technologies, terrain, or strategies that favor defending over attacking, such as guerrilla or siege warfare; (3) the escalation of states’ war aims, which induces fiercer resistance in the opponent; (4) one side’s intention to annex and colonize its adversary’s territory; and (5) the belief that a population cannot be controlled.

This understanding of civilian victimization helps explain why combatants target civilians in some wars but not in others. In World War I, for example, all participants expected a short, victorious war but in reality were confronted with a protracted and bloody slugfest. Unable to prevail in the trench warfare on the continent and unwilling to abandon their goals of overthrowing Prussian militarism and restoring a balance of power on the continent, British leaders tightened the naval blockade of the Central Powers, denying food to hungry civilian populations. Germany, too, attempted to sever Britain’s lines of communication with U-boats, albeit with much less success, and launched the first extended strategic bombing campaign, killing 1,336 British civilians. Similarly, in World War II, faced with a costly invasion of Japan’s home islands, American leaders turned to strategic bombing as a means to achieve that goal at low cost, a campaign that culminated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

America’s recent wars, by contrast, have all been fought at low cost against weak opponents: 147 Americans died in the first Gulf war, 38 were killed in Afghanistan, while none at all perished in Kosovo. Moreover, an adherence to international norms protecting noncombatants in war has spread and grown stronger. At present, therefore, the normative environment and America’s overwhelming power both point in the same direction, allowing the United States to act on its liberal beliefs and eschew targeting civilians intentionally. As long as the United States continues to fight low-cost wars, civilians will remain off-limits. Should the United States actually encounter an opponent who can inflict casualties on American forces, however, civilians may again come into the crosshairs.
The Weatherhead Center awarded five grants to Harvard doctoral degree candidates who are in the early to middle stages of dissertation research projects related to international affairs. In most cases the predissertation grants will be used during the summer for travel and other research related expenses. The grant recipients and their research topics are:

**Cari Jo Clark**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Population and International Health. A study designed to estimate the extent of and factors associated with domestic violence against women in Amman, Jordan.

**Daniel Epstein**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. A comparison between the development of political parties in democratic Russia and Brazil; an analysis of Russian regional party organizations.

**Michael Horowitz**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. Cross-national differences in evaluations of power undermine the assumptions of current deterrence research. This study will utilize qualitative case studies and statistical analysis to build a more accurate way of predicting deterrence failures.

**Mikhail Pryadilnikov**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government. An examination of the process of state-building in postcommunist Eastern Europe by focusing on bureaucratic transformation.

**Allison Brownell Tirres**  
Ph.D. candidate, Department of History, and J.D. candidate at the Harvard Law School. A study of the legal history of the United States-Mexico borderlands, with a focus on border residents and their experiences with legal institutions in an international zone.