In June 2002 the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs vacated Coolidge Hall, 1737 Cambridge Street, and moved to 1033 Massachusetts Avenue. This long-awaited move is part of the large-scale project to provide a better and more effective work environment to everyone at our Center and also to our colleagues in other research centers focusing on specific countries or regions of the world, as well as in other wings of the Government Department. The Weatherhead Center expects to return to its 1737 Cambridge Street address some time in mid-2005.

The Center was housed at Coolidge Hall for about a quarter century. I am one of the very few members of the Center today who worked in Coolidge Hall during all of those years. I will not miss the obstructed vision in Coolidge Hall’s “acoustically challenged” seminar rooms, where the expression “climate control” was a year-round bad joke. In summer, I will not bemoan having to choose between freezing in seminar rooms or shutting down the unacceptably loud air cooling system to hear the speaker. No tears will be shed for the Coolidge Hall elevators that broke down about once a week, increasingly posing safety hazards to all users. There is little nostalgia in leaving the Bowie-Vernon room, shaken by the rumble of trucks and fire engines on Cambridge Street. Gone from my winters, I hope, is the high risk of slipping on the icy, dangerous ramp in front of Coolidge Hall.

We expect to be at 1033 Massachusetts Avenue for three years. The wooden paneling in our new quarters has a touch of elegance, the ambiance of which Coolidge never quite enjoyed. The flow of people through the Center should be more effective once our glacial-speed landlord (the University) installs proper signs so our offices can be located with ease. Several offices are smaller (mine is 40 percent smaller) than in Coolidge Hall, but once we occupy our share of offices in the building’s mezzanine, some time this winter, the Center will house the same number of people as it did in Coolidge Hall. The most noteworthy change in the Center’s demography shows that we now house more professors than ever. It can now be revealed that this Center director’s worst nightmare for the last two years was the fear that we would need to shrink by about fifteen people and that we would not be able to serve faculty needs appropriately. None of that happened.
Ever since the September 11 attacks of last year, I have resolutely believed that the response to terrorism, by the United States and other nations, ought to be undertaken squarely within the confines of what I will call the "international system." By that I mean the United Nations institutions, together with the body of human rights and humanitarian law that either came into being after World War II or were (as in the case of humanitarian law) much enhanced after the war.

I have believed in the importance of the international system for three reasons.

First, the events of September 11 are themselves best understood as a fundamental violation of international human rights and humanitarian norms. Direct and intentional armed attacks on defenseless people unmistakably constitute a "crime against humanity" and should be dealt with as such.

Second, the "international system" was designed to help states avoid the strong temptation to overreact in the face of public emergencies such as those caused by terrorism. That temptation is so devilish just because the need for heightened vigilance is so obvious. The United Nations system, with all of its imperfections, remains an indispensable means for rallying collective, cooperative action, and thereby discouraging impetuosity and arbitrariness in international affairs. Moreover, scrupulous adherence to international human rights and humanitarian norms under conditions of public emergency is strong proof that a country is not overreacting.

Third, the United States, under present circumstances, bears a special responsibility to uphold and strengthen the international system. Its enormous, and virtually unchallenged, military and economic might undoubtedly sharpens the temptation to overreact and overextend. With apologies to Lord Acton, if power corrupts, superpower may well “super-corrupt.” Furthermore, the United States does not, as we know, have a particularly distinguished record in coping with national emergencies. James Madison summarized things best in 1798: “Perhaps it is a universal truth,” he said, “that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad.” Finally, because of its unrivaled position, the United States has a golden opportunity to set a good example for the rest of the world. That is reason enough to bend over backwards to support the international system.

Since September 11 of last year, how has the Bush administration been doing in regard to supporting the international system, and particularly in regard to its Iraq policy? The overall record as well as the policy toward Iraq, is deeply and in my view, disturbingly, ambiguous on that score.

Not everything is negative. From time to time, the administration has done the right thing. Nine days after the attacks, President Bush stated that the campaign against terrorism is “not just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight.” More than once he has affirmed the importance of the rulings of the United Nations, together with international human rights standards, as imposing binding obligations on the United States in its “war on terrorism.” Most important, the U.S. explicitly justified its military response to Afghanistan last year in reference to the UN Charter, and specifically invoked several post-September 11 UN Security Council resolutions, including one that authorized force in exercising “the right of national self-defense against an armed attack.” All this, and some other things we could mention, is very much in the right direction.
There is, however, a dark side. That is, in general, what I would describe as a pattern of initial defiance toward international institutions and norms followed under pressure by reluctant, even grudging, acquiescence. One sees this pattern, for example, in regard to the application of the Geneva Accords to the prosecution and treatment of the detainees at Guantánamo in Cuba. One also sees it in respect to the special military tribunals that the president instituted last year, and then, in response to strong reaction, brought somewhat closer to the standards of due process.

But more to the point, this same pattern is at the heart of the policy toward Iraq. You are fully aware of the sequence: Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney, supplemented by a number of statements from the president, set the initial tone with uncompromising observations about why the U.S. must now solve the problem of Iraq, quite on its own if need be, and on terms, including “regime change,” that it should dictate. The original formulations explicitly evaded the need for new Congressional or Security Council authority. As we know, such unbending unilateralism was not thoroughly well received at home or abroad, and the Bush administration, true to pattern, partially (and, I think, reluctantly) acquiesced. It finally agreed to submit its case both to Congress and the Security Council, while still recommending resolution language that preserved wider discretionary authority for the U.S. than either body was initially happy with. In the Congress, we have witnessed a process of adjustment and compromise that ultimately yielded a resolution that is improved for having tied the president’s action more closely to the UN Security Council process than the administration originally favored.

On the other hand, the resolution is still too open-ended. The language does not, as it should, link the right of national self-defense against Iraq to the U.S.'s continuing obligation under Article 51 of the Charter to seek Security Council confirmation for any use of force. Nor does it, in my opinion, sufficiently acknowledge the continuing, overriding authority of the Security Council under Article 39, to determine “any threat to the peace.”

As to the resolution now being drafted by the Security Council, one hopes that it will bring attention back to what has unquestionably been the dominating concern about Iraq since 1991: finding an enforceable disarmament policy. One also hopes that emphasizing that common focus will work to strengthen an underlying idea of the UN, namely, “collective security” — an idea, incidentally, that has not had much currency of late, particularly on the part of the Bush administration.

Still and all, it will be asked: Doesn’t Saddam Hussein’s startling ability to defy the international system, by pursuing his weapons programs despite all the Security Council huffing and puffing, prove that the international system is a paper tiger? Is it not time for the vaunted international system to step aside and allow for effective, albeit unilateral, U.S. action?

There is, to be sure, something to these claims. On any reasonable assessment, the Security Council’s longstanding apprehensions about Saddam are justified, while its disarmament record is, especially recently, dismally ineffective. Worse yet, that record of failure has been re-enforced by the unseemly reluctance of several Security Council members to give up ulterior economic and strategic interests in Iraq. And it also needs to be conceded that all the threatening talk by the Bush administration is in large part responsible for the renewed international concern over Saddam’s delinquency.

Nevertheless, there is another side to the story. At least up until the Gulf War, the United States, because of its own ulterior strategic interests, actively supported and strengthened Saddam, and even assisted in obscuring his genocidal treatment of the Kurds. Somehow this part of the record is never mentioned when we talk about the “malfunction” of the international response to Saddam Hussein!

But even more significant is the gravity of the risks of a war with Iraq that is undertaken without substantial international support. The prospect of

Continued page 10
Student Council’s International Careers Dinner

On October 23 at Eliot House, His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, founding president of the Republic of Zambia (1964-1991), was the featured speaker at the annual International Careers Dinner of the Weatherhead Center’s Student Council. The dinner was part of an entire week that featured panels on careers in international business, journalism, diplomacy, development, and international law. Above, Dr. Kaunda greets Harvard College junior Thenjiwe Nkosí. At right, Harvard College sophomores Itumeleng Makgetla (left) and Simidele Dosekun await at the start of the dinner.

Undergraduate Student Open House

Center Director Jorge I. Domínguez and Student Programs Coordinator Clare Putnam converse with Jackie Shull, a Harvard College junior and member of the Weatherhead Center Student Council board. At the open house, undergraduates met affiliates of the Center and learned about opportunities for undergraduates, such as thesis research grants, Student Council events, research workshops, research assistant positions with Fellows, and grants for student groups.
From the Director ...

In 2005 we will move again, to the “Knafel” building, named in honor of Sidney Knafel, who provided the leadership and resources to launch this creative solution to the manifold office space problems that have plagued large numbers of professors and students over the years. There will be another building of comparable size across the street from Knafel. The Knafel building will also be connected by a bridge to the thoroughly renovated house still sited at 1727 Cambridge Street. The houses at 17 Sumner Road and 38 Kirkland Street will be preserved but also renovated as part of the new Center for Government and International Studies (CGIS). The Weatherhead Center will occupy space on the second floor of Knafel, the first two floors of the house at 1727 Cambridge Street, and the second floor of the other main building across Cambridge Street.

The new buildings should have much better meeting rooms to encourage the collective intellectual life of the Center, such as our seminars, workshops, and conferences. The new building should facilitate communication between faculty and students and between specialists from related disciplines. It will permit better clustering of Center programs to advance a shared intellectual agenda. It will be well equipped with state-of-the-art technology for use in classrooms, seminars, and lecture halls as well as to obtain information through our new high-tech library of the twenty-first century. The new case study-style lecture hall, in particular, should be a joy for use in classes, conferences, and teleconferences. We expect to foster inter-Center collaboration more effectively and will continue taking steps to realize gains from proximity.

The Cambridge City Council has yet to authorize the construction of a tunnel under Cambridge Street that would connect the two new main buildings. I confess that I had never worried about this authorization, but I was wrong. I had always thought that if Harvard had not proposed to build a tunnel the City Council would require it. This underground construction would permit serving the new buildings (and others on nearby sites) from below ground, uncluttering the nearby streets from service trucks. The tunnel would direct pedestrians from Cambridge Street, reducing traffic jams and preventing accidents. Now that it is clear that the University will build these new buildings, I hope that the majority of the Cambridge City Council will recognize that while the tunnel will serve the University, it will also benefit the city and, most importantly, the neighboring residents.

This is my seventh year as Center director and the last of my second full term as director. In that time, the Center’s name has changed. Now its address has changed. My hope for the future is that the Center’s transformation will continue and deepen in order to better serve the needs of its members and the intellectual and practical challenges that we, as members of the University community, face in this new century.

Jorge I. Domínguez
Director
Although rich scholarship and innovative practices can be found in Southern countries like Brazil, India, South Africa and Thailand, far too little of this information and knowledge arrives at international centers of knowledge production and dissemination in the North. Nor is knowledge shared sufficiently among researchers and practitioners across Southern countries. The project on "Social Movements in the South" aims to help fill these gaps by bringing together scholar-activists and activist-scholars from four important developing countries in a multi-year initiative on the topic of social movements.

Individuals from these four countries on the project's international coordinating committee have been discussing such a collaborative project over the past few years. On the basis of their individual and collective expertise on social movements, committee members selected this topic mindful of the current impasse in social movement scholarship—particularly in the North and in the West. Moreover, Brazil, India, South Africa and Thailand offer exciting and rich experiences for comparative research, theory development, and practical innovation. Organizers share the conviction that a cross-regional, cross-country, cross-institutional, and cross-disciplinary research project on Southern social movements, based primarily on the work of scholars from the South, will have a tremendous impact on the field—and in the field.

An inductive and open-ended approach underlies this initiative. The project intends to build from the rich experiences and understandings of different social movements in the four countries on the basis of the analyses of researchers and activists from each country. They will formulate common thematic foci, methodologies, and conceptual frameworks, and they will develop critical and constructive contributions to social-movement theory and practice. While extant conceptual frameworks on social movements surely will provide direction and guidance, these precedents will not constrain the critical and creative possibilities of the project. The core of the project will involve four workshops and various meetings, events, and joint efforts over three years.

From May 17 to 20 this past spring, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs hosted the first of the four international workshops planned for the broader "Social Movements in the South" project. A model of university-wide collaboration, the workshop was jointly sponsored by the Weatherhead Center, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, the Asia Center, and the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations. Sanjeev Khagram, assistant professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, organized the Harvard workshop. Professor Carlos Vainer of Brazil, Professor Viviene Taylor of South Africa, Professor S. Parasuraman of India, and Professor Surichai W'angaeo of Thailand are coordinating the overall project, together with Professor Khagram.

The objectives of the first workshop were threefold: to assemble scholars to present and share initial research papers on various social movements in their respective countries; to begin developing common thematic foci, conceptual frameworks, and methodological approaches for a broader, three-year project; and to discuss activities, funding, logistics, and a timetable for the next three years. Teams of five to six distinguished scholar-activists and activist-scholars from Brazil, India and South Africa, and a single representative from Thailand, participated in the workshop and will continue to be involved throughout the project. Overall, the participants strongly believed that this initial workshop achieved their objectives and declared their eagerness to continue their collaborative work.

Scholars on social movements devoted the first three half-day sessions of the workshop to sharing and discussing draft papers from each of the four countries. The set of case studies of social movements from each country entailed at least two that were considered "conventional" or "modern," such as trade union movements, and at least two that might be understood as "new" or "post-
modern,” such as environmental movements. Scholars selected the particular case studies of social movements across the countries in order to provide especially rich comparisons. For example, participants presented case studies on landless and peasant movements in each of the countries. But at the same time a case study on Amazonian social movements in Brazil and one on anti-privatization movements in South Africa did not have counterparts in the other countries.

The next several sessions of the workshop were devoted to the process of developing an initial set of common thematic foci, methodologies, and preliminary conceptual frameworks for the overall project. It was agreed that researchers from countries of the North and West increasingly employ a set of conceptual tools in making sense of the emergence and trajectories of social movements. Resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, individual and collective identity formation, strategic framing processes, repertoires and cycles of collective action, cultural politics, discourse—these are some of the core analytic elements routinely involved in explaining and interpreting the nature, timing, location, effects, and meaning of social movements. Indeed, the coordinating committee's selection of the case studies was partially based on these theoretical orientations.

But these concepts have largely been crafted by scholars working almost exclusively from empirical research on domestic social movements operating within Western industrial democracies. This is in spite of the fact that a rich array of research is available on local, national, and transnational social movements around the world. Moreover, these core concepts mask a continuing and deep divide in U.S. and Northern-Western scholarship between the “political process” and “new social movements” theoretical approaches. The former has been criticized for focusing too much on the how of social movements—organization, politics, and resources—while neglecting the why of movements. The latter has been criticized for “throwing the proverbial baby out with the bath water” by focusing almost exclusively on individual motivations, inter-subjective meanings, and processes of collective identity formation.

Research by Southern scholars has generally not featured this “Tower of Babel” stalemate. For example, it became clear from the case studies presented during the workshop that conventional modern movements were very much identity-based, and most new post-modern movements were often deeply materialist in orientation. Indeed, several innovations in this sort of social-movement theory, which either resolve aspects of this primarily Northern-Western debate or completely bypass it, have been generated in countries like Brazil, India, South Africa and Thailand.

Participants found it extremely worthwhile to compare and contrast the conceptual themes and methodological approaches they had found to be most illuminating and useful in their own country-based work. It became clear that Southern scholarship also addresses several themes that research on domestic social movements within Western industrial democracies have either missed or forgotten, including the role of violence, the conditioning effects of international forces (such as the inequalities of globalization), relations between movements at multiple levels of political authority, the challenges/opportunities of non-democratic or differently democratic political contexts, and the interactions between social movements and more formal nongovernmental/non-profit organizations, among others.

Moreover, it seemed to the participants that the activity of social movements, both within the Southern countries and transnationally, had been increasingly more visible and seemingly more innovative than in their counterparts in the North and West. Many, although not all, Southern social movements seem to be on the upswings of their cycles, are innovating new strategies and tactics of collective action, and are infusing energy into international and transnational social-movement structures and activities. The assertion that these Southern social movements are “dependent” on their Northern and Western counterparts did not seem to hold up to critical and informed examination.

The final two sessions focused on the activities, organization, funding, logistics, and timetables for the rest of the project, including the work to be completed between and during the subsequent three meetings. The participants agreed that the overall project will attempt to include different types of activities beyond the three annual

Continued page 10
Six Harvard College students spent part of last summer in Rwanda to observe and record how the Rwandan government is seeking justice for the estimated 800,000 mostly minority Tutsis who were killed in 1994 when the small African nation erupted in widespread ethnic violence. The Weatherhead Center supported this group, comprised of Alfa Tiruneh, Leila Chirayath, Justina Hierta, Catherine Honeyman, Shakirah Hudani, and Andrew Iliff, for their proposal on a stunningly important topic—researching transitional justice in Rwanda. Tiruneh, an undergraduate student associate of the Weatherhead Center, received supplemental financial support for her senior thesis, proposing to compare the Rwandan Gacaca system of transitional justice with a traditional Ethiopian mechanism of conflict resolution.

These undergraduates came together through an informal network of those interested in African development. Several of the students had completed a fall 2001 class taught by Robert Bates, Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and faculty associate of the Weatherhead Center. Under his guidance, and with the assistance of Jens Meierhenrich, lecturer in the Departments of Government and Social Studies, who accompanied the students to Rwanda, the students organized the trip and planned their research strategy. The research team obtained additional backing from Harvard’s Center for International Development, Department of Government, Undergraduate Committee on Human Rights, Committee on African Studies, and the Harvard College Research Program.

Rwanda: A historical snapshot

A country slightly smaller than the state of Maryland, Rwanda had a pre-genocide population of approximately 7.5 million. The two major ethnic groups in Rwanda have endured long-standing tensions and decades of conflict. The majority ethnic group, the Hutus, overthrew the ruling Tutsi king in 1959, and many of the Tutsi minority fled to neighboring countries. The children of these exiles later formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and the rebel group returned to Rwanda in 1990. This sparked a civil war that along with several political and economic upheavals exacerbated ethnic tensions in the country, culminating in the outburst of genocide in April 1994. The Tutsi rebels defeated the Hutu regime and ended the killing in July 1994. During these three months upwards of 800,000 Tutsis, Hutu moderates, and government opponents were killed, leaving few unaffected by the violence.

Innovative Justice: the Gacaca Courts

In the aftermath of the genocide, the newly formed Rwandan government was faced with bringing to justice the huge numbers of participants in the genocide. According to the draft report written by the student research team, over 120,000 people have been incarcerated, of whom only a tiny proportion has been tried in the eight years since the war ended. At its current pace, the government estimated that it would take over 200 years to try all prisoners within the conventional court system. In response to this situation, with the participation of representatives from the military, academia, and the NGO community, the government launched a new system of transitional justice: Inkiko-Gacaca, or the Gacaca Jurisdictions. Inkiko-Gacaca (pronounced “in-khi-ko ga-chach”) is based in part on a form of community-based conflict resolution indigenous to Rwanda named gacaca after the practice of settling disputes while sitting together “in the grass.” The students reported that in 2001 a significant number of communities nationwide elected 19-member panels of judges from among their own adult residents, and these inyangamugayo, or
“persons of integrity,” were trained a few months later. In mid-June 2002 the pilot phase of the transitional justice system commenced, in which selected communities met weekly in order to contribute and document the information needed to determine property damages, victims, and perpetrators of the genocide. Despite the absence of some basic guarantees of due process for the accused, the innovative system offered the only hope of trial within the foreseeable future for the tens of thousands detainees. The difficulty that the reconciliation process poses cannot be understated. The system must address the challenges of establishing just and consistent judicial standards and a reliable infrastructure in an impoverished country, and of reintegrating a significant percentage of the prisoners to the communities where their crimes were committed.

Destination: Rwanda

The students spent part of the summer in the Rwandan capital of Kigali, where they interviewed NGOs and foreign government representatives, including President Paul Kagame. They also spent time searching for documentation on the structure of the Gacaca courts, as most updated documents are not available outside of the country. When Gacaca opened on June 19, the students observed the first meeting in a Kigali suburb, and in the more rural Byumba, north of the capital. Soon after, the group focused its Gacaca observations on Butare Province, where the National University is located. Their observations of the Gacaca meetings were supplemented by visits to prisons around the country to conduct interviews of those in detention for genocide-related crimes.

At the end of the six weeks Tiruneh traveled to Ethiopia, and Honeyman and Hudani stayed in Rwanda to complete a draft of their report for the Rwandan Supreme Court. The report includes a host of logistical suggestions—such as providing shelter for the proceedings during inclement weather—as well as more in-depth recommendations on judicial procedures and on handling crimes of retaliation. Honeyman, the primary author of the report, noted that a potential problem with the Gacaca courts relates to a larger concern about the general sense of community ownership of and participation in the Gacaca judicial process. For instance, one of the greatest obstacles to obtaining complete and accurate testimonies during Gacaca is that survivors and witnesses are concerned that their participation will result in retribution from perpetrators, if they are still free, or from their relatives. The judges worry that their leadership positions and roles in crime categorization make them vulnerable to certain people within the community, thereby greatly reducing their ability to act impartially. The judges are also subject to outside coercion and pressure, especially from governmental and other influential figures. The families of perpetrators believe that the confession or indictment of their relatives may lead to retaliation against them. The perpetrators themselves are concerned that they will be subject to crimes of vengeance. Finally, many within the prisons wonder if they will be eligible for compensation, if they are found to be innocent.

Reflection and Revision

The students have returned to campus and are now engaged in the fall semester’s coursework. They plan to update their interim report because many of its findings were based on preliminary observations of the courts and the judicial proceedings. Although they were present during the crucial first stage of the judicial process during which the communities compiled lists of the deceased and the accused, the students acknowledge that some of their conclusions may have to be amended as the next stages (categorization of the accused, followed by trial) evolve. The Weatherhead Center looks forward to monitoring the students’ further engagement in this process.
Iraq, the United Stated, and...

a post-war Iraq indefinitely under the political and economic control of the United States has all the earmarks of a neo-colonial undertaking that has most of the rest of the world, understandably, up in arms. Worldwide apprehension only deepens in the face of suggestions by members of the Bush administration that overthrowing Saddam Hussein and reforming Iraq is but the first step in “a strategic transformation of the whole region.” Such a geopolitical vision combines neo-colonialism with neo-imperialism in an extremely frightening combination. The likely consequences of such ill-considered policies could in fact be quite catastrophic. It is, then, the need to restrain dangerous unilateralist impulses on the part of the Bush administration that is one additional reason for favoring continuing cooperation with the international system.

Add to that the extensive uncertainties concerning the threat Iraq represents. I need not rehearse the details of the intense and rather inconclusive debates surrounding Saddam’s nuclear capabilities, or his disposition to use them or other weapons, or his connections to terrorism, or his designs on the United States. The central point is this: As things stand it is very hard to be sure about a number of the key concerns. Under conditions of uncertainty, it is prudent to find policies that reduce uncertainty, as the inspections proposals being discussed right now in the Security Council are clearly intended to do. Even if Saddam finally thwarts an inspections policy, he will be thwarting a collective policy, and presumably face a collective response. That is a crucial difference.

Karl Deutsch, former professor of government here at Harvard, once said during a debate over the Vietnam war, “When in doubt, kill fewer people.” We might expand on Professor Deutsch’s wise words: “When in doubt, get wider support.” Both versions are profoundly relevant to our present situation.

Social Movements...

workshops, including: macro-comparative studies utilizing historical and structural approaches; specific joint comparative research projects on particular aspects and/or specific types of movements; dialogues and joint projects with social movements within and across countries; researcher exchanges; and graduate student exchanges.

The participants also agreed that the overall project will attempt to generate several types of products and outcomes. Initially, the first workshop generated between 20 and 25 research papers on different social movements in the four countries. These papers are being revised, refined, and disseminated in several ways: as working papers at various institutions, as journal articles, or as contributions to edited volumes. Over the long term, participants foresee the production of more comparative empirical, methodological, and theoretical papers and books on social movements.

In addition to other products, including training handbooks and guides for social movements, participants discussed other possible project outcomes such as strengthening relations between researchers within and across countries, strengthening relations between researchers and social-movement activists within and across countries, and developing a transnational network of social-movement researchers and social-movement activists. Finally, all participants agreed that the overall initiative could offer insights, inputs and recommendations for further South-South-South cooperative projects on various issues, and that future cross-disciplinary, cross-institutional, cross-national, cross-regional projects could also be very successful.
Weatherhead Foundation Grants an Additional $6 million to Center

The Weatherhead Foundation voted in September 2002 to award $6 million to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs to provide additional support to the Center’s student programs and the work of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. In 1998, Albert and Celia Weatherhead and the Weatherhead Foundation had endowed the Center with a gift of $21 million. Renamed the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs in recognition of the Weatherheads’ great generosity, the Weatherhead Center as a result has become an increasingly vital generator of fundamental research in the disciplines of international affairs.

Student Programs
The Weatherhead Center’s Graduate Student Associate Program is already widely recognized as representing the “best practices” at Harvard on how to engage and support the work of graduate students. It is, not coincidentally, a major contributor of excellent candidates for studies in the Harvard Academy. The Weatherhead Center also has a dynamic and successful program for undergraduates, the heart of which is the Undergraduate Associate Program, which provides summer research grants for pre-senior year thesis writers.

Income from the Weatherheads’ new gift will ground the Center with a much stronger financial basis for supporting Graduate Student Associates’ research. The Center will sponsor completion grants for doctoral dissertation research and for pre-dissertation research grants. It will also provide improved infrastructural support—such as the purchase of additional computers, printers, and related information technology—and expanded opportunities for conferences featuring graduate student research. The gift will produce other important investments in scholarly development in the undergraduate area, including funds for international travel for senior thesis-writing undergraduates, and will allow the Center to initiate a program of summer research-related training in language or skill acquisition for both undergraduate and graduate students.

The Harvard Academy
The Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies is dedicated to increasing general knowledge of the world’s major cultures and of the relations among them. The Academy’s existence is based on the premise that knowledge and understanding of other countries and cultures require a combination of rigorous disciplinary skill and deep area expertise. Harvard faculty created the Academy in 1986 in response to a diminishing attention to area studies—local language, culture, history, and institutions of other societies—in the training and research of social scientists. The Academy’s core mission seeks to bridge the gap between the social sciences and area studies. It achieves this by identifying outstanding scholars who are at the start of their careers and whose work combines excellence in the social sciences with an in-depth grounding in particular non-Western countries or regions.

The Weatherhead Foundation’s initial grant to the Center included funding to strengthen the Harvard Academy’s endowment “to enable it to appoint more scholars, develop a fuller program to make use of the [Academy Scholars’] talents, and to integrate them closely with other Center programs.” While these goals are being met, this new grant will allow the Academy to increase support for Academy scholars and Harvard junior faculty through a combination of new activities. The Academy will be able to raise the stipends of Academy Scholars, expand its program of conferences, supporting many more such initiatives, and engage former Academy Scholars by fostering the development of an Academy Scholars’ network to promote the Academy’s mission in the broader academic community. Funds will also be used to expand the capacity of the Academy’s Web site to encourage communication among the members of this scholarly network.
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H arvard University, as an employer, and the Weatherhead Center, as a unit of the University, are privileged by their location in a highly educated region of the United States. The Boston metropolitan area has a high-density population of cosmopolitan and talented professionals, many of whom are happy to establish their work life within the world of higher education. This population is also quite young, which accounts for the velocity of people’s comings ... and goings (often to pursue graduate studies).

Both the intellectual capacity and sheer good will of the Weatherhead Center staff are recognized not only by members of the Harvard faculty whom it serves, but also by peers throughout the University. Over the past year, these are the important individuals who have joined the fold to make things work at this Center:

Wanthani Briggs is staff assistant for Weatherhead Center administration, publications, and student programs.

Elizabeth Burden is staff assistant to Professors Jeffry Frieden, Iain Johnston, and Lisa Martin.

Theresa Camire is program coordinator for the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival.

Nadine Gerstler-Lopes serves as staff assistant for Weatherhead Center conferences.

Leah Kane is staff assistant to Executive Director Jim Cooney.

John Kuczwara is staff assistant for the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations and assistant to Professor Susan Pharr.

Deborah Lee is research assistant for the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies.

Rachel Milner is program coordinator for the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution and assistant to Professor Herbert C. Kelman.

Shannon Rice is program coordinator for the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations.

Aya Sato-DiLorenzo is staff assistant for the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations.

Rebecca Webb is managing editor of the journal, International Organization.

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