FROM THE DIRECTOR

“This is perhaps not the best time for the hedgehog, who seeks to know a big thing. It is preeminently a time for foxes, who know many things.” Dr. Benjamin Brown, the beloved, longtime director of the Center’s Fellows Program wrote this—echoing the Greek poet, Archilochus, and the philosopher, Sir Isaiah Berlin—on the occasion of the Center’s twentieth anniversary. In 1978, he served concurrently as the Center’s acting director. Ben’s passing some weeks ago was marked recently at a service at Memorial Church led by Prof. J. Bryan Hehir. The Center honored Ben as he would want us to honor him: holding a well-attended seminar to reflect on issues of deep and everlasting but also current significance in the company of professors, Fellows (current and returning), students, and staff—the international relations of the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001.

I write these words a few days after that terrible moment. Ben’s thoughts are prescient, as always, but also humbling, for at a moment like this I think of myself as neither a hedgehog nor a fox. And yet, I am comforted by Ben’s hopes for the Center’s future, writing in the same report that the “Center’s flexibility, its capacity for innovation, and the multiple strengths that it has developed in responding to profound and persistent change, equip it to play a significant role” in the tasks that face us all in this community joined with those everywhere committed to the survival and expansion of freedom and justice.

In this context, I sometimes forget that I had been on leave during academic year 2000-2001. In my absence, Prof. Jeffry Frieden led the Center as acting director very effectively; we are all in his debt for his intellectual and directorial leadership. The Center successfully continued its work supporting professors, students, and Fellows.

Important changes have been under way at the Center. Steve Bloomfield chose to step down as director of the Fellows Program. He served this program and the Weatherhead Center with distinction, elegance, and grace. We are fortunate that he has agreed to become director for public information at the Center to enable all of us to communicate more effectively with the audiences we seek to reach. Dr. Kathleen Molony is the new director of the Fellows Program.

Laura Hercod stepped down as the Center’s administrative officer, moving to the land of surfing and earthquakes. Laura helped to manage the Center’s major transition provoked by the Weatherhead gift. In ways large and small, her imprint on the Center endures to our general benefit. I miss her personally as well because she had earlier worked with me as my staff assistant and I had come to rely on her advice. Maura Dowling is the new administrative officer.

The Center has also been developing programmatically. Prof. Robert Barro and Dr. Rachel McLeary have launched an exciting project on religion, political economy, and society, seeking to understand important aspects of each and the
China and the Global Order

Alastair Iain Johnston

As a teacher and scholar my job is to take things that are complex and turn them into things that are simple and easy to understand. Here, however, I want to take a complex topic and make it even more complex. Specifically, I want to talk about a key analytical problem in thinking about China's role in the global order, such as it exists. The problem is the extent to which China is a non-status quo or dissatisfied state.

It is a truism that the nature of Chinese power and how it will be used by China's political leaders in the 21st century will have a critical effect on a range of global and regional issues—proliferation, global warming, arms control, economic development. None of these common problems can be solved without China's cooperation. This is not news, and you don't need a Harvard professor to tell you this.

This is the premise of so-called engagement, whether practiced by the U.S., Japan, Southeast Asia or other countries. But what makes engagement controversial—at least in the U.S.—is how this cooperation can be elicited. At the risk of simplification, engagers generally believe that by pulling China into international institutions a process of constraint and socialization will lead to a greater stake in existing international rules, norms, and regimes. Critics doubt this will work.

What isn't controversial about engagement, however, is its starting assumption, one that is shared by the critics of engagement. The assumption is that China remains, to varying degrees, outside of an international community, and the goal is to bring China into the community so that it abides by the rules and norms of this community.

For example, in March 1997, in outlining national security policy for a second term National Security Advisor Sandy Berger referred to engagement as a strategy designed to pull China "in the direction of the international community." The common refrain across the political spectrum in analyses of China's behavior in the EP-3 incident was that China wasn't abiding by the "rules of the game," that is, acted in an "uncivilized" manner, that it hasn't fully joined the "family of nations."

The common themes in these discourses are: China is not yet or is only just becoming a constructive participant in the international community. It does not yet wholly endorse global norms of conduct. And it isn't yet working to build a secure international order.

Beneath these claims are even more basic, implicit assumptions, namely that there is an international community and that this community shares common norms and values on human rights, proliferation, trade, and other global issues.

So the entire debate in the U.S. converges for the most part on similar assumptions and arguments—that China is not a status quo power. While this assumption is shared, the difference across positions in the debate over China policy revolves around the question of whether China can become a status quo power peacefully and in a stabilizing manner.

The engagers say yes—through involvement in international institutions, trade regimes, and with the development of domestic economic and political interests with a stake in these institutions. The opponents doubt it. They point to the continuing existence of a Marxist-Leninist ruling party, corruption, entrenched militarized interests and values, and a historical Middle Kingdom world view all as potential obstacles to the development of status quo interests in China. Thus, for them, there are really only two options—the military and technological containment of the current regime, and efforts to change the regime and promote its collapse in some fashion.

The assumption, then, is that China is a non-status quo state, a revisionist regime that if it had its choice would change "rules of the game" and alter "international norms." While this assumption of the non-status quo nature of Chinese diplomacy is the starting point for much of the U.S. discourse about China, it is a surprisingly under-examined one.

I want to suggest that this entire premise—that China is a non-status quo state operating outside some self-evident international community with self-evident and consistent international norms and needs to be brought inside—is too simplistic. The reality is much more complex and underscores precisely how difficult it is to analyze Chinese foreign policy.
What does it mean to be a status quo or non-status quo power in international relations (IR)? Typically, the definition of status quo in IR (and in the U.S. debate) is vague. Status quo states are those that have participated in designing the "rules of the game" and stand to benefit from these rules. In the words of Ken Organski and Jack Kilger, revisionist states, or challengers, want a "new place for themselves in international society" that is commensurate with their power. They have a "desire to redraw the rules by which relations among nations work."

Thus "status-quo-ness" is defined by whether or not a state challenges the outcomes of interaction in a system—the distribution of power that puts them in a subordinate position. A state that upholds these outcomes but uses violence to do so is still a status quo state, by these definitions.

The Clinton and now the Bush administrations, I think, basically accept these notions of status quo and non-status quo. China is a non-status quo state because it remains outside or partly outside existing institutions that constitute the world order and because it would like to change the rules and norms (and distribution of power) that undergird these institutions.

(A quick side note: in domestic politics, non-status quo-ness typically refers to the use of extra-parliamentary means to change political outcomes. Political losers—people dissatisfied with political outcomes—would not be labeled revisionist if they used legitimate means such as elections to change these outcomes. If this concept of status were applied to IR, then China would be a status quo state if it used essentially non-violent, institutional means to challenge extant "rules" and U.S. unipolarity.)

Is this true? Is China outside of the international community? There are at least three plausible things one could look for to conclude that a state was outside of the "international community." The first and most obvious is that its participation rates in international institutions are low; it simply isn't involved in the many institutions that constitute the international community.

A second indicator might be that the state may participate in institutions, but it doesn't accept the norms of the community. It breaks these rules even while it is present in the institutions that create them.

A third indicator might be that although it participates in these institutions, and although it may abide by norms temporarily, if given the chance it will try to change these rules and norms in ways that defeat the original purposes of the institution and the community.

Let me go through each of these in order: Concerning participation rates, in fact, since the 1990s China's presence in international institutions has reached levels fairly close to those of major industrialized states and traditionally active developing countries such as India. In the mid-1970s China was in about 30 international governmental organizations. The U.S. was in close to 80. By 1996 China was in around 50, the U.S. around 65. If one uses level of economic development (as measured by GDP per capita) as a predictor for international organization (IO) participation (on the assumption that wealthier societies had more demand for institutions that regulate complex international economic relationships), China's actual IO memberships ranged well below the predicted number into the early 1990s. From then on, the actual number of memberships has exceeded the predicted number. China is, in a sense, over-involved given its level of development. Finally, if one looks at the number of arms control treaties that China has signed as a portion of the number it has been eligible to sign over time, China has gone from very low participation rates to relatively high ones (signing about 20% of the number it could have signed in the 1970s, for instance, but signing about 80% of the number it could sign by the late 1990s).

So on this first indicator, it would seem that China is now "inside" the international community.

What about the more stringent second indicator—participation mixed with willful non-compliance with the major requirements and obligation of membership in institutions? If one looks at some of the major regimes in the international system, the commonly identified clusters of international norms in human rights, free trade, arms control, and proliferation, the picture is again very complicated.

**Human Rights:** China is routinely accused of violating international human rights norms.

The first problem is, how should the international human rights regime be defined?

By the positions taken by a majority of states on China's human rights practices? Yet China has put together a coalition of states to vote to quash every resolution critical of the PRC that has been introduced in the annual UN Commission on Human Rights meeting since 1992. This simple majority action criteria would place China on the "inside" of the regime.

If one uses the constitutional practices of the majority of states in the international system, however, China would be "outside," since a ma-
jority of states in the international system function as constitutional democracies.

A second problem is that based technically on perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative international statement of the content of the international human rights regime—the Vienna Conference Declaration of 1993—the "international community" recognizes the equal status of individual political civil liberties and collective, social, and economic rights (e.g., the right to development). In this regard, when in its bilateral diplomacy with China the U.S. measures China using the standard of political civil liberties, and when China responds by stressed collective social and economic rights, both are misrepresenting the "international community's" standards.

Free trade: In the reform period China has moved generally to support norms of global free trade outright, even though compliance with and implementation of these norms will be difficult even after entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (though one of the main sources of protection may be local governments rather than the central government).

In concrete terms, China's average tariff rate has declined from above 40% in 1992 to just under 20% in 1999. These will decline further with WTO membership (to an average of 9.4% for industrial products and 14.5% for agricultural products by 2004-2005).

China's entry into the WTO is the clearest statement that officially China embraces the extant free trade regime. No doubt there will be accusations of violations. This is routine under the WTO. That is why there is an elaborate process of consultation and adjudication. But the process of adjudication is very conservative. If China violates the regime it will be found to have done so and urged to rectify its behavior. It will be very hard for China to escape international scrutiny.

Arms Control and Proliferation: On these issues China's performance has generally been no worse than other major powers in the last decade. The major exception is the transfer of nuclear weapons-related technology to Pakistan in the 1980s and M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan in 1992. Since agreeing to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), since signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the U.S. government at least officially adjudicates Chinese performance as improved, though problematic in some cases. As most recently put by a senior State Department official, the Chinese are "less active traders and proliferators than they used to be" (New York Times, September 2, 2001). The continuing concerns are either in dual-use technologies that China has the legal right to transfer, or in the case of missile components to Pakistan, transfers that may violate unilateral statements made to the U.S. rather than formal multilateral agreements.

More generally, China has signed onto a number of potentially constraining arms control agreements. The CTBT is the most notable, as it severely constrains China's ability to modernize its nuclear weapons warhead designs. As yet there is no credible evidence that China has violated this commitment.

On another core international norm—state sovereignty—China is one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional absolutist concept. Indeed, China has been fighting a conservative, rear guard action to reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against efforts to wear this down in the face of challenges from evolving concepts of human rights and domestic governance.

All of this highlights the fundamental problem for scholars (and for policy makers if they are honest about it) in assessing the degree to which China is upholding or challenging international norms: these norms themselves are often contradictory. What constitutes a coherent body of international norms endorsed by a single international community when the sovereignty norm grates with the free trade norm or the evolving humanitarian intervention norms? If Singapore opposes the U.S. on human rights questions, but supports free trade, where does that put it? Inside or outside the international community?

As for the third indicator of status quo-ness, does a state make great efforts to change the rules of global or regional institutions in ways that defeat the purposes of these institutions? Does it try to undermine the established "rules of the game?" This is hard to gauge because the term "rules of the game," as it used both in realist international theorizing and in the public debate, is so vague.

Let me suggest a couple of indicators one might logically look at, however, to concretize the concept of "rules of the game:"

• Does China try to change the actual written or informal rules and procedures that govern the functioning and purposes of major institutions once it is inside?
• Does China routinely oppose the interests of states that one could more or less non-problematically consider “status quo states” in major international institutions?

As for the first indicator, concretely, what has China proposed as rules for institutions versus what it has accepted? The gap may say something about what the rules would have looked like had Chinese leaders designed them predominantly by themselves.

In international economic institutions, at least, most academic observers are generally sanguine about China’s conformity to extant rules. The best studies on China’s involvement in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund all suggest generally sound performance. The Chinese government has tended to meet its reporting requirements, for instance, and there have been no dramatic efforts to change the way decisions are made to favor China.

Moreover, even if China desires to change the rules by which these institutions actually function, it is not all that easy. I am not an expert on the WTO, but experts tell me that the only way that the major norms and values and targets embodied in the WTO can be changed is by dominating the various global negotiation rounds. Since decisions in these rounds are taken by consensus, a state has to utterly dominate a round, mobilize large coalitions, and somehow convince the minority to go along. Consensus systems are, in fact, highly conservative because they allow small numbers of actors to block decisions. So it would not be easy to dilute the WTO’s ideology of free trade and low barriers to the movement of capital, even if the Chinese leadership wanted to do so.

In security institutions the picture is somewhat less clear. Take the CTBT. Had the bargaining positions with which China began the negotiations prevailed in the design of the CTBT there is no doubt the treaty would be less intrusive and less strictly monitored (assuming, of course, these initial positions reflected basic preferences as opposed to opportunistic opening gambits). Moreover, states would have been allowed to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions. On the other hand, had the Chinese bargaining position prevailed, nuclear weapons states would have had to abide by a no-first-use pledge (if verified, this would reduce incentives to rely on nuclear weapons for security). Moreover, while the CTBT would have had weak on-site inspection provisions, it would have had a very expensive and extensive satellite monitoring capacity.

In some instances the Chinese leadership’s preferences are for certain arms control rules that already exist. For very clear security-interested reasons—the PRC opposes the dismantling of the ABM treaty.

As for the second indicator, does China increasingly oppose the interests of other states that most critics of Chinese non-status quo-ness would consider to be status quo states? In other words, is there divergence or convergence with interests of other major powers and states one might commonly believe are “inside” the “international community”?

This is, of course, an exceedingly complex question, and it ideally requires inventorying a long list of economic, political, and social interests, expressed in a wide range of international fora. But one quick and dirty way of getting at this is to look at the congruence of voting in the United Nations. It turns out, if one uses an index of similarity (basically a spatial model measuring the distance between country A and B on one or more policy dimensions) developed by two recent Harvard PhD’s, Kurt Signorino and Jeff Ritter, China’s index of similarity with states such as Indonesia and Mexico is quite high over the 1980s and 1990s. The average index is lower for relations with developed states such as Britain, Canada, and Japan. It is lowest, by far, with the U.S.. However, over the 1990s, the index of similarity has increased slightly between China and these other states, except in the case of the U.S.. Thus, whatever growing friction there is between U.S. and Chinese interests—manifested in UN voting—this is not an across-the-board phenomenon in China’s relations with a range of other “status quo” states.

Despite all this evidence of the ambiguity of the claims about China’s “non-status quo-ness,” is there any sense of the term by which China could be viewed as non-status quo?

In fact, there is. There are three territorial issues where the status quo currently is that Chinese leaders do not control areas they claim belong to China and where they reserve the right to use violence to change these facts. These issues are Taiwan, the South China Sea (Spratly Islands), and the East China Sea (Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands).

Territorial issues historically have tended to be at the root of most major interstate conflicts in the modern sovereign-state system. Territory is often seen as a zero sum issue. It is often seen as a symbol of sovereignty and legitimacy, not just as a source of resources. China has used force more frequently and with higher levels of violence over territorial issues than any other issue since 1949. This is similar to the pattern for many other “new” states.
Now, for Asians or the U.S. (due to its security commitments to Taiwan and Japan) this analysis may not be reassuring because, after all, the clearly non-status quo elements of Chinese foreign policy are issues that directly affect peace and security in Asia.

Thus the focus in the academic, punditry, and policy worlds needs less to be on inaccurate, grandiose strategies for “bringing China into the international community” and more on the concrete management of conflict areas in Asia-Pacific, and in particular managing the Taiwan issue. Ultimately whatever behavior the U.S. finds objectionable in Chinese foreign policy almost always relates back to the Taiwan question.

In macrohistorical terms it is important to recognize that China is now more integrated into global economic, political, normative, and security structures—such as they are—than ever before in its modern history. Remember, 25 years ago China was still arming revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia aimed at overthrowing pro-U.S. governments. Except for its membership in the UN, it was virtually outside of international institutions, and it managed an autarchic economy.

Such a recognition doesn’t mean that the territorial disputes are any easier to resolve. But it does allow a more measured, and less hysterical, assessment of the macro-trajectory of Chinese diplomacy.

The apparent puzzle is that we are seeing growing U.S.-Chinese friction on a range of issues while China’s overall diplomacy exhibits more “status quo-ness” than at any times since 1949. The puzzle is solved when we realize that opposing the U.S. on an issue does not always equal opposing “international order” or the “rules of the game.” Indeed, on many issues—the Ottawa landmines treaty, the CTBT, the world criminal court, among others—the U.S. opposes the emerging global rules, for good or ill, often along with China.

So it may well be that China poses an increasing challenge to U.S. interests in Asia (though I would suggest that in the short run almost invariably this has to do with the Taiwan issue). But we should avoid equating this with challenging “world order.” That may yet happen, but at the moment this order serves many of China’s interests as Chinese leaders have defined them.

In its issue of September 7, 2001, the Chronicle of Higher Education cited former Weatherhead Center graduate student associate and current advanced research fellow with the Center’s Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Christina Davis, as one of “4 Ph.D.’s whose innovative research makes them ones to watch.” The Chronicle quoted Susan Pharr, Weatherhead Center executive committee member and director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, as saying, “A great deal of the exciting work today is done in the trenches between international relations and comparative politics. That is precisely where [Ms. Davis] is working. She’s deeply grounded in a knowledge of one part of the world, Japan, but she also has a sophisticated command of the theories of international relations and international political economy.” This year at the Center Christina Davis is examining the politics of Japanese trade policy in comparative perspective. Her dissertation is “Beyond Food Fights: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization.” Next fall she will become an assistant professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Affirms Indian Rights to Land and Natural Resources

Theodore Macdonald

The Spring 2001 Centerpiece reviewed a pending court case in which a small Nicaraguan Indian community was trying to secure rights to its land and forests. On September 17, 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the highest tribunal in the Americas, released its decision in the case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni. The Court affirmed the existence of indigenous peoples’ collective rights to their land, resources, and environment by declaring that the community’s rights to property and judicial protection were violated by the government of Nicaragua when it granted concessions to a foreign company to carry out logging on the community’s traditional land without either consulting with the community or obtaining its consent. Deeming Nicaragua’s legal protections for indigenous lands “illusory and ineffective,” the Court declared that the government not only discriminated against the community by denying its people equal protection under the laws of the state but also violated its obligations under international law to conform its domestic laws to give effect to the rights and duties articulated in the American Convention on Human Rights. In its ruling, the Court declared that “for indigenous communities the relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession and production, but it is also a material and spiritual element which they should fully enjoy, as well as a means to preserve their cultural heritage and pass it on to future generations.” (Unofficial translation).

Based on these violations, the Court ordered the government to demarcate and recognize the community’s ancestral and historical title to its lands and to establish legal procedures for the demarcation and titling of the traditional lands of all indigenous communities in Nicaragua. The Court also required the government to submit biannual reports on the measures it takes to comply with the Court’s decision.

Significance of the Case

The Awas Tingni case is the first case before the Inter-American Court that directly addresses the territorial rights (i.e., broad communal rights to lands of traditional use and occupancy, not simply the individual right to hold property) of indigenous communities. As defined by such binding agreements as the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Labor Organization’s Convention # 169, “rights” for indigenous peoples include land rights, since their communities’ economic, cultural and spiritual traditions depend upon secure access to their ancestral lands. Without demarcation of their lands, the community of Awas Tingni remains vulnerable to invasion by parties interested in natural resource exploitation. Threats to indigenous lands throughout the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua have raised the possibility of social unrest and even violence.

Similar tensions and underlying concerns help to explain, in large part, much recent direct action—protests, strikes, uprisings, and marches—by Indian peoples in Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Consequently, the Court’s decision sets a far reaching precedent affirming indigenous land rights not only for the indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast but also for indigenous peoples throughout the hemisphere. Moreover, the decision, by specifying required actions to support broad laws, strengthens the rule of law throughout the region.

(For more details, please visit PONSACS’ Web page, www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/).
Following immigrant pathways to and from the United States, observing the nature of life north of the border, and venturing still further north to Nunavut, the Weatherhead Center’s Canada Seminar, since 1978, has been providing nuanced views of the closest trading partner and ally of the United States.

In 2000-2001, seminar speakers included John Hagan, an author and professor of law at the University of Illinois; Anne McLellan, Canada’s minister of justice; and the Honorable Paul Okalik, premier of the newly formed territory of Nunavut. They discussed topics such as the fate of U.S. Vietnam War draft evaders who emigrated to Canada; the similar challenges in, but different approaches to, justice in the United States and Canada; and the past, present, and future of Inuit aboriginal rule over a vast region of ice and water.

The William Lyon Mackenzie King visiting professor of Canadian studies, a faculty chair appointed annually by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, directs the seminar, which is administered by the Weatherhead Center. Founded in 1967, the Mackenzie King Chair was named for an enigmatic Canadian prime minister who led his nation for a cumulative 22 years.

William Lyon Mackenzie King (1874-1950), who won several successive elections and headed the government during the Great Depression and World War II, began his career when he was hired by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in 1914, as an industrial consultant to assist Rockefeller’s Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. Company management was engaged in a bitter Strike with the United Mine Workers, and Rockefeller, according to the Harvard University Directory of Named Chairs, “had a larger purpose in urging the Rockefeller Foundation to use the Colorado situation as a means of recommending a plan of broad application to industrial relations generally.” King did help extricate Rockefeller from the labor dispute and, in 1918, he published a book on his work for the foundation, Industry and Humanity, which reportedly had an impact on Rockefeller’s views and on public sentiment toward Rockefeller.

Decades later, and following a campaign spearheaded by David Rockefeller, Harvard established the William Lyon Mackenzie King Professorship of Canadian studies in honor of this great friend of David Rockefeller’s father. In addition to the initial $100,000 in funding provided by Rockefeller, the Chair received contributions from more than 130 U.S. and Canadian corporations and companies, and from several individuals. And, in 1967, University of Toronto President Claude T. Bissell was named the first Mackenzie King chair and visiting professor.

In 1978, Paul Weiler, Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Mackenzie King chair (1978-1981), and native of Thunder Bay, Canada, developed the seminar as an element of the chair.

“One was really interested in the broader comparative perspective of the United States and Canada,” he says. “Not only in international theory, but in the practical and the political, so that’s how it began.”

“We have had many, many illustrious Canadians at the seminar; we’ve had Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, Kim Campbell [currently a visiting professor at the Kennedy School of Government], and Jean Chretien, as well as a Hall of Fame hockey player and now Toronto Maple Leaf President, Ken Dryden.”

“One of the things I am so proud of,” adds Weiler, “is that the seminar was the first truly Canadian scholarly program, not only at Harvard, but even in the United States.”

Weiler, author of the first scholarly book on the Canadian legal system, In the Last Resort, notes that the Canada Seminar was instrumental in the acceptance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It was during his second year of chairing the seminar (1979-1980) when Weiler wrote a paper later presented at Dalhousie University in Canada. The paper, he says, agrees with what was then a minority view, that Canada should have a constitutionalized bill of rights, with its transfer of some power from the legislature to the courts.

Sentiment in Canada ran strong against such a charter; the Premier of Saskatchewan, Allan Blakeney, was a leading charter opponent and had garnered the support of all but one province. When Blakeney was invited to present at the Canada Seminar, he was persuaded by Weiler’s paper and its ‘notwithstanding clause’—if the courts, with constitutional power, strike down a law, the legislature would have the right to reenact the law, but only by following a careful procedure that gave the electorate the final say.
Blakeney, says Weiler, “came to the seminar, had dinner, saw my paper, and thought it was the right way of accommodating both sides.” Some key people from the federal government were also visiting Harvard and the seminar at that time and became familiar with this concept. In 1982, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, with the consensus of the nation’s premiers, agreed to give Canada the Constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms. And with the “notwithstanding clause” only rarely used because of what was now a popular commitment to these constitutional rights, the Canadian legal system has been transformed over the last two decades.

The Mackenzie King chair often works closely with the Canadian Consul General to New England, a core-sponsor of many seminars. “The Canada Seminar not only focuses attention and study on Canada but acts as a catalyst for the large Canadian community at Harvard, both academics and students,” says Political Consul Dean Sherratt. “And that fact has helped form a great partnership between the Mackenzie King chair and the Canadian Consulate as both reach out to Canadians in Harvard, Cambridge, and Boston.”

The Harvard Trade Union Program, led by Director Dr. Elaine Bernard, co-sponsored the 2000 seminar with Ken Georgetti, president of the Canadian Labour Congress.

“What makes the seminar special is not just the guest presenters, but the seminar participants, who include faculty, students, and staff from many disciplines,” Bernard says.

“The seminar is truly interdisciplinary,” she adds. “And I find the diversity of issues raised at the seminar—spanning culture, politics, law, economics, and the environment—remarkable.”

Professor Jeffrey Reitz, Robert F. Harney Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, held the Chair as visiting professor in 2000-2001. In addition to hosting Hagan, McLellan, Okalik, and Georgetti, Reitz presented the Toronto Globe and Mail newspaper columnist and author Jeffrey Simpson speaking about the experiences of “Star-Spangled Canadians,” Canadians who have migrated south to the United States; Professors Noah Meltz and Seymour Martin Lipset explaining “why Americans like unions more than Canadians do, but join less”; and Phil Fontaine, former grand chief of the Assembly of First Nations of Canada, discussing indigenous peoples’ rule, in a seminar co-sponsored by the Harvard University Native American Program.

And, in 2000-2001, with the support and co-sponsorship of the Weatherhead Center, the Mackenzie King chair hosted the Canadian government’s Policy Research Initiatives March symposium on migration, “Integration Pressures: Lessons Learned from around the World,” and held the May 2001 Canada Conference on immigration, “Diverse Contexts: Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants.”

“The conference included leading Canadian and American immigration researchers—a veritable ‘who’s who’ of immigration research in the two countries,” says Reitz. “It featured immigration to Canada as an important point of comparative reference for the U.S., and also within the larger context of global migration.

“For the symposium,” he adds, “the collaboration of the Policy Research Initiative of the Government of Canada, attached to the Prime Minister’s office, drew upon the [Initiative’s] large network of experts not only from Canada and the U.S., but also from Mexico, Europe, and beyond.

“In my view this provided an important focus on Canadian issues while successfully underscoring the role of Canada in broader international relations. While it’s clear to me that Canadian scholars have much to do in promoting an interest in Canada outside the country, I think the Mackenzie King chair can play an important role in this regard.”

Angelo Melino, an economist from the University of Toronto, is the William Lyon Mackenzie King chair for 2001-2002. Fall 2001 seminars include John McCallum, member of parliament from Markham and former chief economist for the Royal Bank of Canada; Jack M. Mintz, president and chief executive officer of C.D. Howe Institute; and the Honorable Robert Keith Rae, queen’s counsel, officer of the order of Canada, and former premier of Ontario. Spring 2002 seminars will include the Honorable Stephen Kakfwi, premier of the Northwest Territories, and Paul Cellucci, U.S. ambassador to Canada and former governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

The seminar is off the record and open to the public. It runs from 4 to 6 p.m. on occasional Mondays, and, unless otherwise noted, is held in seminar room 3 in Coolidge Hall at 1737 Cambridge Street.
I met Ben Brown in the Lebanon in the late 1950s, when he was vice president of the American University of Beirut and I was attached to the American Embassy. I did not know him well in Beirut, but we corresponded shortly after he returned to the United States to take up residence at Harvard as the director of the Fellows Program at the Center for International Affairs — thus beginning a friendship that resulted in my becoming a Fellow and research fellow at the Center from 1974 to 1978; a most treasured friendship which continued until his death.

Whenever I remember Ben, the first of his sterling gifts that occurs to me was his remarkable erudition, and this included not only his extraordinary mastery of the English language in both the spoken and the written word, but his deep knowledge of great literature, his profound reading of history, and his benevolent grasp of the Greek and Roman classics. A born writer, he was also a splendid lecturer and a peerless raconteur. During a seminar or in ordinary conversation, his keen lucidity enabled him to cut immediately to the heart of any problem, no matter how complex, and to ask penetrating questions.

Ben’s view of the world and of America’s place in it, particularly in the realm of our foreign policy, was much influenced by his personal experience. Following his graduation from Columbia University in 1937, he traveled widely in Europe, not least in Germany, where he observed the erosion of Western civilization as we know it not long before the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the German aggression against Poland on September 1, 1939. His naval service in England at Allied headquarters during the war, and his later service in Berlin and at the United Nations, deepened his personal experience, his practical knowledge of diplomacy, and his view of the world.

Whenever I talked with him, Ben displayed a trenchant understanding of the suffering and squalor of the Third World; he had strong feelings about the role of the United States in addressing the great disparities of wealth between our own country and oppressed foreign cultures. One of his favorite words was “magnanimity”—and he meant this in an almost Ciceronian sense: that we should confront the problems of the world not only for the sake of our self-interest but for the deeper sake of humanity at large and the shape of world order into indefinite future time.

He was greatly troubled by what he saw as the excess of the American military-industrial complex, the misuse in some areas of American power and military force, and Washington’s reliance on surrogate armies to bend various nations to our will when rightly or wrongly we perceived our national interests to be endangered.

In late 1986, when I came back to Boston from a year of preparing a book on Central America, I suffered cultural shock, not from Central America but in returning to the United States and the turbulence of policy in Washington in the midst of the Iran-Contra Affair. With his wise historical sense, Ben referred me to a certain passage in The Education of Henry Adams. At home that evening, I consulted my copy of the masterpiece by the grandson and great-grandson of two brilliant American presidents, and his description of his return from Europe to New York nearly a century ago. If the passage resonated then, in 1986, how morbidly it resonates today in the light of the ghastly tragedy of last week:

“The… city became frantic in its effort to explain something that defied meaning… The cylinder had exploded, and thrown great masses of stone and steam against the sky. The city had the air and movement of hysteria, and citizens were crying, in every accent of anger and alarm, that the new forces must at any cost be brought under control… A traveler in the highways of history looked out of the club window on the turmoil… and felt himself in Rome, under Diocletian, witnessing the anarchy, conscious of the compulsion, eager for the solution, but unable to conceive whence the next impulse was to come or how it was to act.”

Tribute to Benjamin Brown...

Thus history jerks us about, both nations and persons. Earlier in the 1980s, during a dinner in New York, Ben told me of a book he planned to write, about a dramatic episode of late medieval English history involving kings, if I remember properly—but that in doing so he was experiencing tormented hardship in finding his writer’s “voice.” Whether Ben ever wrote his book, either wholly or partially, I do not know. But even after his demise I must reverently disagree with him about his failure to find his “voice.” He did find it. His voice was not in any book he may have wished to write, but in the commanding presence of his life—his unfailing guidance and encouragement, his spiritual generosity, his greatly wise advice and counsel to a generation of Fellows, year after year for a quarter of a century, not only to diplomats and other specialists of foreign policy, but even to future heads of state. How many other scholars can claim as much, or could have spoken with such an enduring voice?

In the words of a Roman sage: “Si monumentum requiris, circumspice”—“If you seek his monument, look around.” And of dear Benjamin might I add, “Requiescat in pacem. Et lux perpetua luceat ei.”

For other reflections on the life of Benjamin Brown visit http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/eulogies.html.

From the Director...

relationships among them. It is funded by the Templeton Foundation. I look forward to the development of this initiative in the years ahead.

As one of the last acts of his presidency, Neil Rudenstine asked the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs to house a new program focused on economics, justice, welfare, and human development. Chaired by Professors Martha Minow and Thomas Scanlon, a faculty committee will spend academic year 2001-2002 shaping the contours of a program that should have a significant impact on research and education. This new program will support research, colloquia, and possibly course development in the months and years ahead. It focuses on the connections between the social sciences and applied ethics. Carol and David Richards have funded this program generously.

The Weatherhead Initiative is now in its second year. The Weatherhead Initiative supports large-scale innovative research on international topics—one major project per year. The first Weatherhead Initiative project, launched in academic year 2000-2001, focused on military conflict as a public health problem. Profs. Gary King (Government) and Christopher Murray (Public Health) co-direct the project. Research on this vast and important topic continues during the current academic year. In 2001-2002, the second Weatherhead Initiative project focuses on the role of identity—national, ethnic, religious, etc.—in international and domestic political and social affairs. Profs. Alistair Iain Johnston and Yoshiko Herrera (Government), Terry Martin (History), and Rawi Abdelal (Business School) co-direct a project already under way that will sponsor various activities in the months ahead.

This is also the first year for the Center’s much-improved Web site, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/. The Web site should soon become the most practical way to remain informed about activities at the Center.

Without regret, indeed with enthusiasm, I look forward to moving the Weatherhead Center out of Coolidge Hall in the summer 2002. It now seems highly likely that the authorities of the City of Cambridge will approve plans to build a new Center for Government and International Studies. Coolidge Hall will be torn down and a new building will be built on its site; a comparable building will be built across the street replacing the structures currently on that site. Four houses, on the same block as Coolidge Hall, will be thoroughly renovated. One of these houses, located at 1727 Cambridge St., will be connected to the new North building. A tunnel will also connect the two new large buildings on both sides of Cambridge Street. This project was made thinkable and possible by the generous founding gift of Sidney Knafel, at the time chairman of the Weatherhead Center’s visiting committee. Starting this summer we will occupy interim quarters at 1033 Massachusetts Avenue. We expect to move to the Center’s new quarters at the start of 2005.

To develop our programmatic ambitions, to sustain a community of thinkers and doers that remains a community of colleagues, and to build a new building, may require us to become hedgehogs and foxes simultaneously. That task seems daunting, but we will persevere and seek to accomplish it.

Jorge I. Domínguez
Director
Graduate Student Associate News

**Judith Kelley** has completed her dissertation entitled “Norms and Membership Conditionality: The Role of European Institutions in Ethnic Politics in Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania” for the Department of Public Policy. Judith is currently teaching a course in the Department of Government.

**Edward Miller** received a Fulbright-Hays fellowship for 2001-02 to travel to Vietnam and Singapore. His dissertation for the Department of History is on American-South Vietnamese relations in the 1950s. While in Vietnam, he is conducting archival research in the records of the now-defunct South Vietnamese government. He will also be a visiting associate at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. Ed will be back with the Center and the GSA Program in Fall 2002.

**Min Shi** completed her dissertation entitled “Essays in International Economics” for the Department of Economics. In August 2001 she took a position as assistant professor in the Department of Finance, Investment and Banking at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

**Lucia Volk** completed her dissertation entitled “Missing the Nation: Lebanon’s Post-war Generation in the Midst of Reconstruction” for the Committee on Middle Eastern Studies and the Department of Social Anthropology. She is currently a lecturer at Harvard teaching a course in Anthropology and a course in Social Studies.