CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POVERTY ERADICATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the relationship between culture and poverty, paying special attention to cultural diversity, economic development, and the challenges facing the reduction of poverty in a culturally complex world. Over the last several decades, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and even economists have examined the relationship between culture and poverty in an international context, producing a remarkably diverse and in recent years increasingly sophisticated literature (Rao and Walton 2004). Yet the term “culture” has meant different things to different scholars, and part of our challenge is to assess those meanings against what we know about poverty and development. We cannot hope in these few pages to cover all this work, address all its complexities, or even summarize it faithfully. Instead, we cover a narrow but critical set of issues we find especially important for those attempting to reduce poverty or its consequences in the globalized world in which we live.

One common and controversial belief about the relationship between culture and poverty posits that the former causes the latter—specifically that individuals either are or remain poor because of their cultural beliefs and attitudes, and that societies fail to overcome underdevelopment because of their national or collective cultures (Harrison 1985; Harrison and Huntington 2000). For example, some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are thought to remain underdeveloped due to a lack of social cohesion, inclination to justice, and interest in engaging their full potential. In this general view, culture is thought of as the sum total of a society’s beliefs, norms, values, and, attitudes. We do not subscribe to these views. We certainly believe that norms and beliefs can affect patterns of behavior, and that patterns of behavior can be conducive to low socioeconomic attainment. Nevertheless, the political process and economic conditions can shape behavior much more strongly than beliefs and norms; beliefs and norms are malleable, fluid, and dynamic; and the collective beliefs of a society or group are usually heterogeneous, often inconsistent, and even contradictory. All these factors make culture a weak “explanatory variable” in the simple model by which cultural deficiencies cause poverty, a model that, furthermore, distracts policy makers from demonstrably more useful understandings of the role of culture in the eradication of poverty.

Instead, in the pages that follow we argue that beliefs, norms, and values constitute only one of several, more important dimensions of culture, most of which do not bear a simple cause-effect relationship to poverty. In this vein, we suggest that it is important to study not just the impact of culture on poverty but also that of poverty on culture; that culture can shape how people understand and experience poverty; that the more serious cultural challenge to the eradication of poverty lies not in the consistency of beliefs in a given society but in their inconsistency and heterogeneity; and that the malleability and fluidity of culture provide some of the key attributes to be understood and exploited. For these reasons, we suggest that those working toward the reduction of
poverty or alleviation of its effects should address culture more seriously than many have been willing to in the past.

To frame our discussion, we follow the arguments by Amartya Sen and others that the study of wellbeing should focus not only on material poverty but also, more generally, on the capabilities people have to acquire the goods (or realize the functionings) they have reason to value (Sen 1985, 1999). The benefit of this approach from our perspective is that it moves us away from a rather narrow perspective by which the consequences of culture would center on its relationship to people’s income, employment, or wealth. The idea of capabilities, however, brings up the thorny problem of subjectivity in wellbeing: capabilities depend on social circumstances and also on what people wish for, which depends on cultural circumstances. We cannot resolve those issues here but we identify those circumstances were some understanding of their import will probably be crucial.

Cultural diversity takes different forms in different settings; in some, such as South Africa and the U.S., it may be associated with racial differences; in others, such as Nigeria, with religious or ethnic differences. Much of our empirical work has been based in the US, though one of us has also conducted work in France. In the first half of the paper we often use the example of the U.S. to frame some of the issues we find important. In the second, we expand more generally to an international context.

II. CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF POVERTY

Perhaps the most appropriate way to rethink the simple causal model described earlier is to think of the opposite relationship, to consider the cultural consequences of experiencing sustained poverty. For years, the most prominent, if controversial, theory in this vein was Oscar Lewis’ (1959; 1969) “culture of poverty.” Lewis argued that this culture emerged when populations that were socially and economically marginalized from a capitalist society developed patterns of behavior to deal with their low status. This behavior, which Lewis observed among families in Mexico and in Puerto Rico, was characterized by low aspirations, political apathy, helplessness, disorganization, provincialism, and the disparagement of so-called middle-class values. Once this culture was in place, Lewis argued, it developed mechanisms that tended to perpetuate it, even if structural conditions changed. This work has been criticized at length, in part for assuming that cultures were internally consistent and also for its lack of empirical support (Valentine 1968; Lamont and Small forthcoming).

In recent years, scholars have examined this question with greater theoretical clarity and empirical rigor. The cultural consequences of poverty may categorized into those caused by individual poverty and those caused by neighborhood or community poverty. It is important to note that these are not merely two versions of the same effect observed at different levels. Individual poverty, for example, might be experienced in a context of either collective poverty or collective prosperity. In the former, the cultural consequences may be different from those in the latter, where relative deprivation is likely to play a role.

Many have examined the long-term consequences for individuals of living in sustained poverty or unemployment. For example, in a recent work, Wilson (1996) argued that sustained unemployment specifically affected daily habits and work
orientations. The practices of waking up every morning at a given time, having to attend work or meetings and meet employment responsibilities form part of people’s habitus, or dispositions toward behavior, that are themselves conducive to sustained employment. When “work disappears,” and individuals do not participate in the formal labor market, people are likely to lose those cultural dispositions. Something similar was observed during extended unemployment by Bourdieu (1965) among Algerians and Jahoda and by Lazarsfeld and Zeisel (1971) during an economic depression in Austria.

Much more recent work has focused on the community-level question. The consequences of neighborhood poverty—specifically, of living in a neighborhood with a high concentration of poor individuals (regardless of whether the actor herself is poor or not)—have been a subject of intense scrutiny during the 1960s and 1970s and again in recent years in U.S. scholarship (Wilson 1987; Goering and Feins 2003). The earlier literature examined culture at length, but without the theoretical precision of recent works; the recent scholarship exhibits much more sophistication, with the use of survey data, ethnographic data, and even field experiments, but unfortunately without much examination of culture. Among the earlier studies the standout is Hannerz’ (1969) examination of conditions in a high poverty, predominantly black neighborhood in an unnamed US city. Hannerz found that the community had developed both mainstream and ghetto-specific forms of behavior, with individuals adopting one or another as circumstances demanded.

More recently, scholars have found that neighborhood poverty can have cultural consequences for both individuals and neighborhoods as a whole. Smith (2005, 2007) studied African-American job finders in Michigan and found that living in concentrated neighborhood poverty reduced trust in social networks, such that people were less willing to help others find jobs. On the consequences for neighborhoods, scholars have found consequences very consistent with Hannerz’. Anderson (1999), in a study of black urban neighborhoods in Philadelphia; Small (2004), in a study of a Puerto Rican housing complex in Boston; and Harding (2007), using national U.S. survey data on poor and non-poor neighborhoods, have all found that neighborhood poverty is often associated with cultural diversity—that is, a situation in which multiple beliefs and scripts about appropriate behavior coexist in one context, such that residents are forced to choose among different patterns of behavior, all of which are socially acceptable.

The three studies point to different aspects of the question. Anderson advances a distinction between “street” and “decent” families in neighborhoods that alludes to Hannerz’ work, but, by focusing on differences between types of actors as opposed to types of attitudes, perhaps does not move us forward as it could. Small identifies heterogeneity, but also provides a model as to how it comes about. He shows that at times cohorts of residents exhibit relatively consistent cultural narratives about the neighborhood itself—e.g., on whether it is a good or bad place to live—and that cultural heterogeneity may come about as elders are replaced by newer or younger cohorts. Harding provides comparative data to show convincingly that, at least with respect to beliefs and scripts about sexual behavior and romantic relationships, poor neighborhoods are more culturally heterogeneous than non-poor neighborhoods. His work suggests that relative deprivation may have more salient cultural consequences than deprivation in the context of collective poverty.
A recent study by Young (2003) provides important insight into the relationship between individual and neighborhood poverty. Young interviewed African American men, living in poverty and residing in high poverty neighborhoods, about their understandings of themselves and their aspirations. He found that those who rarely left their neighborhoods and who were most socially isolated were the most likely to believe in the tenets of the American Dream, that through hard work and dedication they could improve their own circumstances. Those who spent more time regularly outside their neighborhoods, and who therefore had greater contact with wider society, were more likely to believe that racial discrimination was a serious obstacle to their advancement.

III. COUNTERCULTURES AND THE REPRODUCTION OF POVERTY

An important issue that follows from examining the cultural consequences of poverty is whether these consequences are, themselves, self-perpetuating. The paradigmatic model in this vein has, in some sense, been Lewis’. Lewis did not merely argue that in conditions of poverty people develop the cultural beliefs and attitudes described earlier; he also argued that, once in place, the culture of poverty was self-perpetuating, so that people were unlikely to change their behavior even if the structural circumstances that led to it changed. This proposition was perhaps the most controversial, and it may have proven one of the least supported. For example, in the U.S. many conservative commentators argued that unemployment rates among blacks were high because of their unwillingness to or cultural predisposition against work. However, as job markets tightened dramatically over the late 1990s, the black unemployment rate plummeted (U.S. Census Bureau 2001: Table 593).

The theoretical assumptions have been criticized as well. Many researchers argued that the development of cultural attitudes and beliefs inconsistent with personal success in capitalist societies were themselves acts of resistance, conscious and not so conscious, against the economic systems of such societies. In one of the most cited models, John Ogbu (1978; Fordham and Ogbu 1986) argued that the situation of poor ethnic minorities in societies had to be understood in light of their migration to such societies. Some were voluntary minorities, groups that had moved to a society willingly and in search of political freedoms or economic opportunities. Others were involuntary minorities, such as slaves and indigenous people, groups that had become ethnic minorities as a result of conquest or violence. Ogbu argued that ethnic groups in the latter category were likely to perceive themselves as fictive kin (“brothers” and “sisters”) and to remain acutely aware of the structural constraints on their advancement (such as the ethnic job ceiling and institutional discrimination). As a result, they were likely to develop an “oppositional culture,” a set of attitudes and beliefs fundamentally at odds with those of mainstream society, one in which subscribing to mainstream beliefs—such as participating in the formal economy or attaining success through the standard educational pathways—was considered disloyal to the fictive kin group. While groups were internally strengthened through the formation of this collective culture, their members’ individual prospects for occupational success were, ironically, weakened. Ogbu tested his model on, not surprisingly, adolescents in school, where presumably their future aspirations would be easiest to perceive. He found that many black students in the
U.S. urban schools he studied complained about students who “acted white” and referred to those who attained good grades as “brainiacs.” In this sense, cultural conditions helped reproduce poverty.

This model appealed to scholars and policy makers. It provided a way of looking at culture that did not “blame victims” for their problems, and it presented a model that provide an elegant and comprehensive view of differences in poverty across a range of groups and societies in a way that appeared intuitively correct. However, it was not until the late 1990s that the model was tested explicitly, and the tests found reasons to question it. Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey (1998) examined among a national population of students their attitudes about education, homework, educational attainment, the importance of school, and the role of education in popularity. They found that black students were either no different from whites or more likely to support mainstream ways of attaining success, in direct contradiction of the thesis (see also Cook and Ludwig 1998).

There are broader concerns with the model, however. Notice that in Ogbu’s model culture is both internally consistent and static—the set of beliefs and attitudes about attainment that involuntary minorities are reputed to have is not inconsistent, and, once established, it does not change. Both ideas about culture seem difficult to support. Many, for example, have written of the wide array of beliefs present in urban African American culture, a model in which heterogeneity and opposing views, rather than consistency, seem to reign (Hannerz 1969). In addition, culture changes, an idea given little thought in this context. And yet it is by examining how and where culture changes that the possibility for other forms of change emerges.

Returning to our broader theme, the issues of oppositional culture and cultural resistance point to an additional difficulty: that of conceiving of wellbeing as depending not just on poverty but also on people’s capabilities. Sen and others have argued that whether people are doing well in light of what they are capable of doing depends not merely on their given society but also on their interests and predilections. For example, most would agree that reducing illiteracy can be conceived as an objective, not subjective goal in practical terms. But when we are concerned about wellbeing, we worry not that every person has a college education, but that those who wish for one are able to attain it. Certainly, the evidence does not bear out an overarching conception of oppositional culture in which most members of involuntary minority reject normal channels of success. Nevertheless, in the context of resistance cultures, it is clear that individuals may be culturally at odds with the expectations of their wellbeing assumed by mainstream society or international standards. There are no answers based on universals that would apply in all circumstances. Yet no successful approach to poverty can fail to recognize the possibility of cultural beliefs or attitudes born of resistance or rejection of mainstream paths to wellbeing. In particular, while preserving traditions may often be interpreted as a form of cultural resistance that is counterproductive from the perspective of economic development, it can also sustain strong group relationships that act as bases for collective empowerment. In turn, cultural erosion that results from industrialization often weakens traditional solidarities and networks of mutual support and hence produce new forms of poverty. The pursuit of economic development often recreates the very problems that it aims to alleviate, but under new guises. Fortunately, new sites for solidarity often emerge as minority and low-status groups are confronted with new
challenges (e.g., Mooney (forthcoming) on the Catholic Church and Haitian immigrant communities in Miami, Montreal and Paris).

IV. CULTURAL DIVERSITY AS A TOOL FOR SELF-EFFICACY

Cultural difference from the mainstream is not always a rejection of mainstream ways, and, in fact, cultural difference can be a tool for success, rather than failure, in contemporary capitalist societies. That cultural diversity can itself become a tool for development, self-efficacy, and development has been contested for some time. Banfield expressly argued that cultural traditions in many parts of the world undermined the possibility of political and economic development. What he termed an “amoral familism,” a strong sense of patronage and in-group resource allocation in which merit played little role, was a strong obstacle to development. Other scholars have made similar arguments about economic development in Latin America and political development in the Middle East (Harrison 1985; Harrison and Huntington 2000).

These arguments, however, have tended to be supported by very little evidence. The idea that cultural diversity undermines progress because it undermines common values is based on the faulty assumption that political and economic progress of the collective depends on those particular beliefs in which the major ethnic and national groups differ, rather than those they share. Certainly, nations differ dramatically and populations within them often vary even more in beliefs and attitudes. Nevertheless, the core notions of respect for life, fairness, economic opportunity, and support of the family are more common than implicitly assumed by arguments of this nature. More generally, many have shown the successful adoption of diversity by individuals and groups throughout society.

Social policies that favor cultural diversity and multiculturalism may sustain the creation of a positive collective identity among members of low-status groups. For example, many pundits have argued that in order for immigrant minorities to do well, they must adopt the culture and language of the new societies in which they find themselves. But researchers have shown that retaining cultural distinctiveness can provide important advantages. In an important study of bilingualism among immigrants in the U.S., Portes and Schauffler (1994) found that children of immigrants who were bilingual performed better on math tests and other measures of academic success than those who had learned English but not retained their language of migrant origin. Others have found that children in school respond positively to culturally relevant materials, and to approaches from multiple, as opposed to one, cultural perspective.

V. CULTURAL DIVERSITY AS A SOURCE OF EXCHANGE, INNOVATION, AND CREATIVITY

A different way to think of diversity is to think of its impact on innovation and creativity. Some have argued that one may increase the level of self-determination among low income or low status minority groups by acknowledging or celebrating their distinctive cultural heritage. While alleviating poverty requires income redistribution and equalizing access to rights, institutions, and other resources, it may also require
interventions that give such groups greater roles in the public sphere while asserting their importance as members of the cultural and political polity. Public celebrations of multiculturalism accomplishes this, but promoting self-determination by recognizing the existence and cultural distinctiveness of the group is probably even more important (see the recent example of the recognition of the Mashpee Wampanoag of Massachusetts [http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2007/11/mashpee_wampano_3.html](http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2007/11/mashpee_wampano_3.html)). These undoubtedly influence shared “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2006) and sustain the development of stronger sense of collective efficacy.

In development circles, recent scholars have argued that we should place greater importance on local knowledge, including the understandings and practices of indigenous and other marginalized groups (Scott 1999: 313-335). Forms of government that require the contributions of a wide range of citizens are often granted greater legitimacy, and are often more effective and better able to mobilize populations in the pursuit of collective goals. For instance, after the All India Institute for Hygiene and Public Health started using sex workers for peer education in condom use in the the Sonagachi district of Kolkata, the rate of HIV incidence went down to about 6 percent in 1999, compared to 50 percent in other red-light areas (Rao and Walton, 2004, p. 8). In her study of efforts to reduce HIV-infection in Uganda and Botswana, Swidler (2007) found that governments and NGOs were effective only when they mobilize the systems of meaning and the social solidarities of the local community. In Uganda, prominent clan structures, even if less democratic than local government in Botswana, provided more effective vehicles for reaching local communities than organizations operated by national or transnational voluntary organizations. Crucial to success were tapping the social imagery of the moral orders prevailing in diverse local communities, invoking the obligations ordinary people feel to their respective friends and neighbors, as well as socially valued models of behavior.

VI. REMOVING STIGMA AS A MECHANISM OF POVERTY ALLEVIATION

How individuals interpret and deal with exclusion and stigma is an important factor in how discrimination affects their mental and physical health and wellbeing (Lamont 2007). Whether members of subordinate groups internalize their lower status and the stigma that comes with it or interpret their situation so as to alter the status hierarchy or power dynamic matters.

Psychologists have given consideration to the intra-psychological mechanisms with which members of stigmatized groups cope with perceived stigma, such as privileging in-group comparisons. Equally important are the variegated frameworks through which people define status, including through standards of evaluation that are autonomous from socioeconomic status (Lamont and Bail 2006). Lamont’s (2000) interview-based study found that African-American working class men differentiate Blacks from Whites by contrasting their “caring selves” with the more domineering self of Whites. For their part, North African immigrants in France challenge stereotypes by demonstrating that they are different and superior to the French on moral grounds. To various degrees, workers in both countries locate themselves above the middle class by pointing to the moral failings of this group. They develop alternative criteria of evaluation that allows them to locate themselves in a hierarchy. These cultural templates are widely shared. Cultural resistance can provide strong cultural backbones to withstand
the challenges of upward mobility, but can come about at the expense of considerable stress (James 1994).

More generally, there are other ways for members of stigmatized groups to gain civic membership. One is to attempt to embrace dominant cultural attitudes, beliefs, and forms; another is to be bicultural, to adopt cultural forms relevant to different contexts by “code switching” (DuBois ([1903]2005; Carter 2006). Strict cultural assimilation, a traditional route, can come about at the expense of loss of identity and of other important cultural assets. Biculturalism has been employed successfully by the upwardly mobile for a long time, but the constant code switching can be alienating, creating people who are fully at home in neither setting (Shoshana forthcoming).

Larger institutional/governmental strategies, such as affirmative action laws or regulations, also promote the removal of stigma and allow individuals different options in how they choose to define their identities. Their usefulness is often context-dependent and debated or contested, as is the case for the adoption of affirmative action policies in Brazil’s higher education (Silva 2007), or the fall 2007 debates concerning the collection of racial and ethnic statistics by the Institut National d’Etudes Demographiques in France, opposed by the Constitutional Council (see http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc23/jurisp557.htm#ftn2).

Considering the culture of the middle class and of political and other elites is crucial to understanding destigmatization strategies and to capturing the broader relationship between culture and poverty. Cultural and social exclusion are features of all systems of inequality (Bourdieu and Passeron 1989), and middle class strategies to pass on privileges to their offspring always constrain options for less privileged groups – for instance, in the United States where school budgets and determined by local taxes, the middle class prices the working class out of residential areas with better schools.

The indifference of elites also often has counterproductive effects. In a systematic comparative study of elite perceptions of poverty in Bangladesh, Brazil, Haiti, the Philippines and South Africa, Reis et al (2007) demonstrated that while elite interviewees from various sectors of these societies discussed poverty as if it were a problem, they had difficulty identifying very pressing or compelling reasons for concern. There was no very strong sense that to tolerate persisting poverty is to allow some valuable human resources to go to waste. Moreover, the classic threats posed by poverty, such as crime, were generally perceived to be rather weak. There was limited support for any notion of introducing a ‘welfare state’ providing broad-spectrum support for the mass of the population on a relatively universalistic basis (support was stronger in Brazil than Bangladesh). The areas of agreement over pro-active policies were that more education was the best way to reduce poverty and that poverty reduction was viewed as primary responsibility of the state.

Whether strategies for dealing with racial, ethnic, or religious stigma can be used successfully to deal with the stigma of poverty is an open question. Low-income groups are by definition deprived of resources. A positive self-concept may not make a real impact on their situation. Nevertheless, recognizing how poverty is sustained by institutional and economic forces has been shown to sustain the poor in their efforts to improve their situation and gain collective efficacy (e.g. Heller 1999 in the case of Kerala, India).
VII. INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

Our arguments imply that the protection of individual rights must include the protection of cultural differences. Successful societies recognize individual and group rights and adopt policies that treat diverse groups fairly and that give people from diverse cultures and ethnicities an equal voice in directing their destinies (Kymlicka 1995; 2007). It is also likely that redistributing resources through universal, rather than targeted approaches, keep stigma at bay and thereby do not discourage the respect for difference. These societies facilitate access to a range of institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and welfare, to a wider range of groups while recognizing their distinct needs. They lower inter-racial conflict by increasing inter-group contacts in many institutions (e.g., in schools –see Warikoo forthcoming) and they insure that groups have equal access to resources. They are societies, in short, that maximize the capabilities of groups and individuals (Hall and Lamont 2007). This last aspect is illustrated by Cornell and Kalt (2000) who shows that American Indian reservations that take a "nation-building" approach (assert sovereignty, think strategically and develop strong governing institutions in accord with local cultures) do better economically. Among First Nations in Canada, communities that embrace traditional values and decision-making practices tend to experience greater economic development (http://www.kivu.com/wbbook/casestudies.html for a description of these communities, such as the Miawpukek of Newfoundland)

There are important controversies over whether cultural diversity benefits or undermines the creation of successful societies. Some have recently argued that diversity makes it impossible to establish common values, or that it disintegrates social capital by reducing trust and cooperation among citizens. If these arguments were right, the only solution would be for countries to block all borders and eject minorities. Naturally this solution is impracticable. This would not only constitute a violation of civic and human rights unacceptable to majorities in both countries but also create nations unable to communicate effectively across cultural barriers.

VIII. HOW TO INCREASE MORAL CONCERN FOR POVERTY IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Our discussion to this point has identified different elements of the relationship between poverty and culture. In what follows, we conclude by providing a notion for how to increase concern for poverty in a diversifying context. We provide five case studies of successful efforts to integrate cultural diversity into these broader aims. Policy recommendations are attached in a separate document.

The growth of transnational populations worldwide is increasing the international awareness of poverty and cultural diversity. When people in the North are actually part of culture and societies rooted in the South, it is much harder to dismiss poverty in the South as a problem of the "other." Nevertheless, high levels of class and racial residential segregation often limits contact between various segments of the population. In this context, cultural institutions are likely to play a central role in diffusing information that
does not travel easily through social networks. Religious organizations have traditionally been crucial in raising awareness of poverty, but much more is likely needed, especially as the retrenchment of the welfare state proceeds in advanced industrial societies.

A key to increasing moral concern for poverty is to identify and demonstrate the relationship between poverty and the inequities associated with it. Many social scientists continue to work on finding the connections between the limited capabilities of the poor and the larger structures in which poor and non-poor are embedded. Others are considering how to make policy makers more aware of their findings (Weiss 1980; Carsen 2008). Still others are more concerned with the popularization of findings through popular media, impressed by the pedagogical power of documentaries by Roger Moore, or the more recent success of Al Gore’s film on global warming. A combined approach operating simultaneously in different spaces and at different scales, and aiming at different audiences is likely to be most successful.

Others have discussed policy-focused solutions (e.g. Rao and Walton 2004). We provide examples of less institutional actions that illustrate best practices:

- The teaching of “fair trade” is spreading rapidly in the British educational system (see http://www.fairtradeschools.org). It successfully sensitizes children to the plight of others and to the conditions of exchange that reproduce inequality. Promoting similar training in other industrial societies would be an effective approach, especially in countries such as the United States where children have only vague notions about living conditions in the economic periphery of the world.

- The Sesame Street Workshop co-produces local versions of Sesame Street in over 30 countries to help promote cultural tolerance and literacy. Through its international co-productions, the Workshop aims to produce social change at ground level: "With today’s global landscape dominated by such pressing issues as poverty, human rights, AIDS and ethnic genocide, the world’s most-watched children’s television show can bridge cultures while remaining socially relevant.” (http://www.sesameworkshop.org/international/portal.php).

- The Global State of Washington initiative is a consortium of more than a thousand Washington State businesses, universities, NGOs and research institutes, along with hundred of civic organizations, that are working together to mobilize citizens to alleviate poverty and enhance rights for all people. They join force to increase the effectiveness of each organization and make Washington State an important global center for sustainable development. (see http://www.globalwa.org/research-reports-and-outputs-1). Similar initiatives are being put in place in Los Angeles (with the leadership of UCLA).

- Ten Thousand Villages (http://www.tenthousandvillages.com/) is a non-profit corporation with more than 160 stores in North America to help craft people from the Global South to distribute and sell merchandise that
express their unique tradition. It works with artisan groups throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America and ensure that workers receive wages they consider to be fair. Efforts such as these thus provide a way in which historically disadvantaged and marginalized groups can tap into global markets without relinquishing their local, traditional ways of life, and while improving their quality of life.

- In Spring 2007, the Transnational Studies Initiative at Harvard sponsored a series of public conversations between immigrant artists and their audiences, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. These events explored the creation and management of the artistic and cultural products of transnational migration, focusing on Latino, South Asian, and Chinese immigrants in Massachusetts. Each event featured a conversation between cultural producers and their audiences about how art speaks to the relationship between homeland, identity, and belonging. Discussions focused on how different cultural products are received, managed and exhibited and on how artistic encounters contribute to strengthening civic engagement and social change in both sending and receiving countries. A teaching film, *Mixing It Up: Mapping Identities through Art*, is now being completed.
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Recommendations

• Policy makers faced with diverse constituencies should focus less on assimilation than on the promotion of biculturalism. In the increasingly globalized world in which we live, societies that resist the impulse to homogenize but instead encourage cultural co-existence are likely to reduce cultural conflict and benefit from the rapid success of ethnic minorities.

• Policy makers should consider religious expression a form of cultural expression, and treat it in the context of diversity of individual expression. Recent years may have witnessed a resurgence of religious fundamentalism of all kinds, and states have sometimes responded by limiting religious expression. This is likely to be counterproductive.

• Policy makers should explore the economic competitiveness of cultural diversity. Employers in many large corporations have already discovered that diversifying the linguistic and cultural skills of their workforce will be imperative to compete in the 21st century. Societies as a whole should consider their economic competitiveness in similar terms.

• Policy makers should diversify the cultural backgrounds of state employees at all levels of the state bureaucracy. The relationships between states and their constituents are likely to become increasingly tense if, in the face of a diversifying population, state offices retain national ethnic or cultural homogeneity.

• Policy makers should support measures that sustain the recognition of the collective identities and self-management of low-status groups. Evidence suggests that such recognition payoff not only in terms of economic development, but also in terms of commitment to larger societal goals. Specific pathways for maximizing the agency of poorer and excluded groups are identified in (Rao and Walton 2004; see especially conclusion).

• International NGOs and governments should be particularly mindful of adapting their development tools to the local context of action, while taking into consideration the cultural diversity of targeted population. Beware of institutional monocropping (Evans 2004).

• Governments should not shy away from collecting statistics on racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups if such statistics may support the development of anti-discrimination measures.

• Qualitative and quantitative data collection on various dimensions of cultural diversity should assist policy decisions. Ethnographic case studies and cross-national surveys on the self-concept of stigmatized population and their strategies for coping with discrimination and gaining recognition would be particularly helpful at this juncture. We emphasize the importance of cross-national data to provide statistics comparable across states and regions.
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